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Foreword  
 
Dear Reader,   
 
On behalf of Columbia World Projects (CWP), we are pleased to present the following report 
on the results of our Forum on Cybersecurity, one of a series of meetings we are holding to 
identify possible solutions to fundamental challenges facing humanity.  
 
Cybersecurity – the practice of protecting systems, networks, programs, and data from digital 
attacks and unauthorized access – has grown increasingly challenging as a consequence of 
increased connectivity through the Internet. It is hard to think of a tool in our contemporary 
society that brings with it such potential for good and for ill as the Internet. On the one hand, it 
can be a catalyst for economic growth and for social change, and can expose us to a wide range 
of information and perspectives. On the other hand, it can be used to wreak havoc on financial 
and commercial networks, to repress dissent, and to undermine democratic processes. The 
Internet is essential to our personal lives and to our jobs, from communicating with our 
colleagues, to receiving payments for the goods and services we provide. Yet the very qualities 
that make the Internet so valuable to society, including the immediate interconnectedness it 
facilitates in a relatively decentralized and open way – make the task of securing the services, 
devices, data, and infrastructure that enable these key functions extraordinarily challenging.  
 
It is commonly accepted that efforts to identify, understand, and address the risks – which 
continue to evolve and multiply with our growing reliance on the Internet – have been 
insufficient, and too often reactive rather than proactive. The same can be said for our response 
to the increasingly complex threats to standalone systems, networks, and programs. Attempts 
to manage cybersecurity have been constrained by existing and sometimes outdated 
organizational and institutional frameworks, outpaced by technological advancements 
employed by malicious actors, and subject to the significant challenge of collaborating across 
the public and private sectors. Furthermore, the rapid development and evolution of new 
technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence and machine learning, continue to create new ways 
to both carry out cyber attacks and defend against them. Yet we are not doing enough to 
mitigate the former or to take advantage of the latter.   
 
For all of these reasons, we decided to focus a CWP Forum on cybersecurity. On September 25, 
2018, more than 35 experts from inside and outside of Columbia University – representing a 
range of substantive and institutional perspectives – came together at Columbia in the City of 
New York. The aim of the meeting was not only to deepen our understanding of complex 
cybersecurity challenges, but also to identify a set of promising projects in which Columbia 
faculty and researchers could partner with practitioners to implement potential solutions. 
These project proposals, developed in advance of the Forum through a collaboration between 
experts and CWP staff, were aimed at finding pragmatic ways to reduce the profound 
vulnerabilities and threats inherent in the Internet – and more broadly in the digital sphere – 
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without undermining its capacity for good. The attached report represents the work that took 
place at that Forum.  
 
While a list of the experts who participated in the Forum and helped draft the report is 
included at the end, the ideas and views it contains are not attributed to individual participants 
or organizations, as was agreed in advance of the meeting. Yet the report does try, where 
possible, to specify the relative support for an idea or point of view, ranging from an individual 
observation to a consensus view. 
 
Even as identifying project ideas to be developed by CWP and its partners is the primary 
objective of this and future Fora, it is also our objective that these gatherings will deepen the 
understanding of complex global challenges, inspire even the most advanced experts to see 
vexing problems in new ways, and encourage partnerships that might lead to breakthroughs 
that improve lives. Thus, in sharing the ideas and insights of experts who have generously 
given their time and intellectual capital to our effort, we hope others will benefit from the 
conclusions they reached and share their own thoughts on these matters with CWP, as we 
continue to seek ways to effectively tackle these challenges.  
 
In a similar vein, there are some ideas that were developed for the Forum that, while not the 
right fit for further development by CWP, are ones we believe are worth pursuing. In those 
instances, we are working to foster partnerships and open pathways, both inside and outside of 
Columbia, that will allow these ideas to continue to develop. We know that complex challenges 
like these cannot be solved by any organization or institution alone, and that it will take many 












Forum Director, Columbia World Projects  
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I. Introducing the Challenge 
 
The Internet is integral to our daily existence and often has a positive impact on our work, 
play, and personal lives. It allows us to connect instantly with friends, family, and colleagues, 
and helps us build and participate in new communities. It gives us greater access to knowledge, 
markets, entertainment, and ideas, and countless other resources than at any time in human 
history. Digital tools promote innovations through global networks, and allow people to share 
medical and safety resources and support swiftly in times of crisis. The Internet has provided 
access to education where it was not previously available, and has enabled improvements in the 
quality of education where it was available. It is where more and more people go to learn what 
is happening in the world on any given day, and where we engage in public debate. It has been 
integrated into every aspect of our national defense. We have even connected the cars we drive, 
the trains we ride, the planes in which we fly, and vital infrastructure serving our cities and 
towns, farms and factories to the Internet, in an effort to make them function more effectively. 
Yet while the value the Internet brings is clear, so are the myriad vulnerabilities that it creates.    
 
Indeed, it is precisely because of the indispensable role the Internet plays in our lives that 
disruptions to the systems, and networks that undergird them, can rapidly bring so much of 
what we do to a standstill, undermine our privacy and civil liberties, and even threaten our 
prosperity and national security. And of course, it is not just systems that are connected to the 
Internet that are vulnerable to digital attack – so too are standalone systems, networks, and 
programs. While it is difficult to measure the precise level of exposure in this realm, there is a 
clear consensus that cybersecurity is one of the most significant and complex challenges facing 
the world today. To give just a few examples, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence said 
cybersecurity is one of his “greatest concerns and top priorities.”1 The U.S. Homeland Security 
Secretary’s has assessed that cyberweapons and sophisticated hacking pose a greater threat to 
the United States than the risk of physical attacks.2 Freedom House concluded that digital 
disinformation tactics have contributed to a global decline in Internet freedom every year for 
the last seven years, and played an important role in elections in at least 18 countries from 2016 
to 2017 alone.3 And estimates regarding the global economic impact of cyber attacks range 
from $400 billion to more than $2 trillion each year.4 So too is there is a growing recognition 
                                                        
1 Dan Coats, “Remarks as prepared for delivery by The Honorable Dan Coats Director of National Intelligence” 
(opening statement, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment, February 13, 2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/item/1846-dni-coats-opening-statement-
on-the-worldwide-threat-assessment. 
2 Kirstjen M. Nielsen, “Rethinking Homeland Security in an Age of Disruption” (speech, Washington, D.C., 
September 5, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/09/05/secretary-nielsen-remarks-rethinking-homeland-
security-age-disruption. 
3 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2017, November 14, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
net/freedom-net-2017. 
4 The true global economic impact of cyber attacks is unknown given, among other things, the lack of verifiable 
data and a common vocabulary. Yet even if one assumes that the most conservative estimate is accurate, the figure 
remains astounding. The figures cited above represent a range of estimates from 2015. See: Stephen Gandel, 
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that technology solutions alone cannot address the many vulnerabilities and possible vectors of 
attack, but rather that behavioral, normative, regulatory, social, and other interventions will 
also be critical to building effective solutions. Yet, despite these high-level warnings and the 
fact that a fair amount of attention and resources have been devoted in the last several years to 
cybersecurity, the increasing sophistication of cyber threats continues to outpace progress, as 
does the number of attacks, particularly in the United States and in Europe.  
 
It was with this understanding – that current efforts to address cybersecurity are insufficient – 
that participants in the Columbia World Projects (CWP) Forum on Cybersecurity began their 
opening plenary discussion. Approximately 35 experts with a range of different substantive and 
institutional perspectives shared their views on the nature of the threat, key vulnerabilities, and 
the particularly intractable challenges associated with addressing them. This discussion 
provided critical context for the concrete project proposals taken up later in the working 
groups (Section II), and helped inform the selection of projects meriting further development 
by CWP (Section III).  
 
The Nature of the Threat 
 
The threat in cyberspace is often referred to as an asymmetric threat – one in which a major 
military power like the United States is vulnerable to attack by less powerful actors. In 
unpacking why this is the case, six aspects of the threat were highlighted by participants during 
the Forum’s opening plenary session: (i) the low barrier to access by malicious actors –  
meaning that it is easy to access digitally, as opposed to physically, high-value assets through 
the Internet; (ii) the low cost of conducting an attack, particularly given that the tools for doing 
so are widely available, relatively inexpensive, and do not require significant expertise to use; 
(iii) the potential for significant damage and high-value return on an attack, given the degree to 
which we rely on the Internet and digitally-connected devices to conduct personal and 
professional activities, as well as to deliver public services that are critical to our survival; (iv) 
the degree to which it is possible to conduct an attack with impunity or even anonymity; (v) the 
asymmetric advantage that attackers have because they only need to find a single weak link in a 
network, while defenders need to secure entire networks; and (vi) the degree to which the 
interconnected and interdependent nature of digital networks means the consequences of an 
attack can spread almost instantaneously, with consequences for individuals and entities far 
beyond an initial target.   
 
Participants also took note of the evolving nature of the cyber threat. One participant noted 
that attacks by foreign governments on the United States over the years have evolved from 
                                                        
“Lloyd's CEO: Cyber Attacks Cost Companies $400 Billion Every Year,” Fortune, January 23, 2015, 
http://fortune.com/2015/01/23/cyber-attack-insurance-lloyds/; Steve Morgan, “Hackerpocalypse: A Cybercrime 
Revelation,” Cybersecurity Ventures, August 26, 2016, https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-original-
cybercrime-report-2016/. 
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intrusions generally aimed at gathering intelligence, to intrusions aimed at influencing actors, 
with greater impact over time as the Internet has become more ubiquitous. Participants 
highlighted increasingly hostile activities on the Internet, principally by state actors, to 
promote disinformation; erode trust in facts; exacerbate existing divisions within societies; 
undermine the credibility of public institutions and processes; retaliate for perceived grievances 
(as in the 2014 Sony Pictures attack); steal intellectual property, including trade secrets or 
other confidential business information; collect private information for possible misuse; and 
conduct activities that make clear that an attack on a high value asset, such as critical 
infrastructure, could be deployed with little warning. Other participants called attention to the 
increasing number of intrusions by both state and non-state actors for financial gain, and of 
illegitimate invasions of privacy through intentional and unintentional disclosures of personal 
information.  
 
Multiple participants pointed out that the fear of a massive cyber attack – what one participant 
called a kind of “cyber 9/11” – overshadows what in their view is the greater risk, which is the 
incremental harm inflicted by a multitude of smaller attacks that occur every day. By focusing 
disproportionately on preventing a single catastrophic attack, participants noted, we are failing 
to pay sufficient attention to stopping a “death by 1,000 hacks.” Participants agreed, however, 
whether in the context of a catastrophic attack or numerous smaller attacks, there are key 
vulnerabilities to be focused on and protected. These include our critical infrastructure – 
systems and assets whose destruction or incapacity would have a debilitating impact on the 
national security, economic prosperity, health, or safety of our societies; and our privacy, 
particularly with respect to our personal information, which has become increasingly 
challenging to protect from both state and non-state actors. A third area of vulnerability that 
was discussed related to information challenges on the Internet, which includes not only 
efforts to manipulate or fabricate information, but also the way such information is shared and 
consumed online, especially on social media.  
 
Finally, there was considerable debate among the participants on whether to include this last 
category within the scope of the Forum’s discussion. While everyone agreed it was an 
important issue, some were of the view that it should not be included, as it was not strictly a 
cybersecurity issue. Others viewed the information challenges associated with the Internet as 
an existential threat to liberal democracies that could be impacted – at least in part – through 
digital or computational measures, and thus argued that the issue should be included in the 
Forum’s discussion. As one expert noted, even determining what constitutes an information 
challenge on social media is challenging. While technology companies define information 
threats primarily in terms of external actors (such as foreign governments or violent extremist 
groups attempting to spread disinformation or propaganda), from a user’s perspective, the 
companies themselves may present an information threat (for example, by privileging and 
amplifying speech that is false, incendiary, or corrosive to the public discourse). Another expert 
pointed out that approaches taken by social media platforms may make it easier (or harder) for 
adversaries to carry out information operations, and highlighted the importance of such 
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platforms for detecting and attributing anomalous behavior. Ultimately, we decided to include 
information challenges within the scope of the Forum.  
 
Key Challenges      
 
Participants discussed a range of intractable challenges that have made it especially difficult to 
address malicious activities in cyberspace. By far the most significant concerns related to 
organizational, behavioral, and institutional challenges associated with the various actors who 
have access to, and consequently must be part of securing, the Internet. While all agreed that 
technical developments were important to understanding the problem and to devising 
solutions, there was also consensus that the main challenges are not purely technological ones. 
In particular, participants underscored: (i) the importance of better collaboration, 
communication, and coordination among and between public and private sector actors; (ii) the 
need for behavioral changes and incentives that promote the use of basic cybersecurity practices 
by individuals, private companies, and public entities; and (iii) the importance of developing 
international norms and a strategy for deterrence, in order to promote stability and reduce the 
risk of inter-state conflicts sparked in cyberspace.  
 
Collaboration, Communication, and Coordination Among and Between Sectors: Participants 
agreed on the importance of the private sector to any cybersecurity strategy. Roughly 85 
percent of the United States’ critical infrastructure is owned or operated by the private sector,5 
and according to a recent U.S. Department of Energy report, an estimated 90 percent of the 
United States’ energy infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector.6 Much of this 
infrastructure employs digital technologies and is connected to the Internet (e.g., the use of 
smart meters that promote more efficient, reliable, and cost-effective use of energy resources). 
Moreover, the private sector is essential to cybersecurity for reasons beyond its ownership of 
and control over critical infrastructure. Participants noted that supply chains that pass through 
the private sector are another important risk to be mitigated. Modern infrastructure and 
weapon systems, for example, are heavily dependent on microelectronics, which have a complex 
supply chain involving multiple industries, manufacturers, and distributors in a wide variety of 
countries. Recent work has underscored the need for new strategies to address this challenge.7  
 
Participants also underscored that the government’s ability to provide for the security of its 
citizens and lay the groundwork for economic prosperity is increasingly dependent on the 
                                                        
5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, The Department of Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Cost-Benefit Report, June 26, 2009, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-654R. 
6 U.S. Department of Energy, Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity, March 2018, 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/05/f51/DOE%20Multiyear%20Plan%20for%20Energy%20Secto
r%20Cybersecurity%20_0.pdf. 
7 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Supply Chain, February 2017, 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/1028953.pdf. 
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private sector to maintain the speed, resilience, and reliability of the Internet and related 
technology, as well as for critical information on these systems. As one participant noted, while 
in terrorism-related security challenges the government tends to possess far more intelligence 
than the private sector, in the realm of cybersecurity, the reverse is true: private sector entities 
often have more, and more up to date, information about specific threats and attacks, as well as 
about the different ways that systems are being compromised.8  
 
In sum, there was unanimous agreement that neither the public nor the private sector could 
address cyber threats alone. Consequently, public-private sector collaboration, communication, 
and coordination on the cybersecurity standards to be applied in the construction and 
maintenance of relevant infrastructure – as well as methods and mechanisms for detecting, 
identifying, protecting, responding, and recovering from attacks – are critical to achieving 
cybersecurity. While particularly the case in the United States, this also holds for many other 
countries around the world.   
 
In discussing the importance of integrated efforts across the public and private sectors, several 
participants highlighted the need for a clear allocation of responsibilities among major 
stakeholders within both sectors, pointing out that the current lack of agreement over roles and 
responsibilities has been a significant challenge in establishing better collaboration, 
communication, and coordination. Some participants indicated that the government and major 
Internet and platform providers should each be taking on greater responsibility for 
cybersecurity, and that a legal and regulatory structure that assigns such responsibility is 
needed. Others were of the view that a voluntary structure would be preferable. Nevertheless, 
all agreed that the current approach places too much trust in, and too great a burden on, 
individual users to make wise decisions and adopt best practices, when we know that 
individuals (and organizations, for that matter) on average do not prioritize basic cybersecurity 
practices. Experience has demonstrated time and again that this expectation is not only 
unrealistic, but dangerous, given that any weak link – all the way down to the level of an 
individual user – can be exploited to compromise an entire system. Participants said decision-
making and responsibility for cyber vigilance should move away from the user end of the 
spectrum, and towards the public and private entities that possess a greater concentration of 
knowledge and resources. But in doing so, the lines of responsibility need to be clear, including 
the roles and responsibilities of different government agencies and departments focused on 
various aspects of cybersecurity, and they need to be communicated in such a way that they are 
understood by key stakeholders.   
 
Participants also referred to the lack of real-time sharing of relevant, timely, and actionable 
threat information between and among critical infrastructure partners and relevant 
government entities, which could improve preventative and proactive response measures to 
                                                        
8 Although, as one expert noted, the government tends to have more knowledge than the private sector regarding 
the malign efforts of state actors, and how governments are incorporating offensive cyber operations into their 
military strategy. 
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potential and actual attacks. Such sharing has proven difficult to establish for a range of 
reasons, including the fact that companies have been concerned about disclosing sensitive 
information, such as the financial data or communications of their clients. What is clear, 
however, is that the lines of communication within the private sector, as well as between the 
private sector and the public sector, require improvement.   
 
Incentivizing Behavioral Changes: Multiple participants highlighted what one called “the 
inability to get the basics done” in the realm of cybersecurity. We know basic steps can be taken 
at the individual level, and through to companies and governments, to dramatically reduce 
vulnerabilities. And yet, even for something as simple as password protection, we continue to 
fail to take those fundamental steps. By way of illustration, one participant noted that while it 
had been 30 years since the first major computer worm (the Morris worm) was unleashed 
through the Internet and wrought havoc, the vulnerabilities revealed in that original attack are 
similar to many of those exploited in attacks today. Technological solutions are often easier to 
devise, participants noted, than ways of effectively changing human behavior, or what cyber 
experts often refer to as better cyber “hygiene.” As one participant noted, we are not investing 
the needed resources, nor providing sufficient incentives, to address these vulnerabilities.   
 
In considering incentives for adjusting human behavior, participants noted that it is important 
to take into account the different capacities of public and private sector actors. For example, a 
small business or a county election office is unlikely to have the expertise or resources to 
prevent or even detect an attack launched by a group of hackers or a foreign government, yet 
these smaller entities receive little support to defend against or respond to such outsized 
threats. When it comes to big companies, however, a participant noted that the risk associated 
with cyber attacks can be substantially mitigated if the necessary resources are expended. 
Nevertheless, most organizations are not willing to invest what is required, the participant 
said, and as it stands now, there appear to be insufficient incentives for large companies that 
have the knowledge and resources to consistently make the required investment across critical 
industry sectors.  
 
When discussing regulatory options and other forms of interventions intended to promote 
cybersecurity through the use of incentives, participants spoke of the need to strike a balance 
between tapping the Internet’s potential to power economic growth, and minimizing the 
inherent security risks. In essence, that means ensuring that companies can innovate and get 
products to market with reasonable efficiency, while at the same time appropriately prioritizing 
security and privacy. Participants noted a similar tension with respect to content moderation 
by social media platforms: while insufficient moderation can allow malicious actors to deepen 
cleavages, spread disinformation, and undermine the social fabric of our societies, so too can 
overregulation stifle free speech. One participant observed that every new communications 
technology has brought with it the fear that the medium would be used by nefarious actors to 
manipulate uneducated segments of the population, and in each instance prior to the advent of 
the Internet, consumers have proven to be savvier than anticipated. 
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Developing Norms and a Strategy for Deterrence: Participants noted that as an increasing 
number of states and non-state actors develop the operational capability to pursue their 
objectives through cyberspace – including the pursuit of malicious cyber activities that have 
impact in other states’ territories –norms and a complementary strategy for deterrence are 
essential to prevent cyberspace from becoming a source of instability that could lead to inter-
state conflict. Developing norms, supported by a strategy to deter actors from violating those 
norms, would assist in reducing the risks of misperception, miscalculations, and escalation; 
deter aggressive action; promote predictability and stability; and ultimately foster collaboration 
among international cyber actors to reduce our collective vulnerability in a way that enhances 
stability. Nevertheless, developing and promoting norms and deterrence – while preserving the 
benefits of connectivity – has proven to be quite challenging. Among the obstacles are: the wide 
range of stakeholders in cyberspace; the existence of rapidly developing technologies that 
continue to change the options for managing and framing cyber norms; the lack of traditional 
jurisdictional markers within cyberspace; the ease with which private and public actors can take 
action and have impact across borders; and concerns among major stakeholders about exposing 
their own sources, methods, and capabilities. 
II. Working Group Discussions  
 
Three of the Forum working groups were focused on the key vulnerabilities raised: critical 
infrastructure, privacy, and information challenges in social media. Additionally, we focused 
two working groups on areas in which we might promote policy designed to influence the 
behavior of responsible users – from governments to businesses to individuals – in an effort to 
better detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, degrade, and respond to the efforts of malicious actors. 
These included establishing and incentivizing the application of standards, benchmarks, and 
best practices; the development of norms and deterrence for public and private actors; and the 
education of individuals regarding the importance of exercising good cyber hygiene and risk 
management in business processes.   
 
Each working group of about seven or eight participants evaluated at least two projects that 
had been developed by participants, in collaboration with CWP staff, prior to the Forum. Every 
project was developed with the idea of: (i) bringing multidisciplinary academic research and 
scholarship to bear on an aspect of cybersecurity in some significant way; (ii) in partnership 
with a practitioner (from outside of academia); (iii) in an effort to produce measurable impact 
within roughly three to five years; and all the while (iv) enriching research and scholarship. 
The lead drafter of each proposal was asked to present a succinct summary of the project, after 
which the moderator facilitated a discussion to provide critical feedback. Of particular 
importance were the following questions:   
 
• Strengths and weaknesses. In particular, are there key weaknesses, omissions, or risks 
in the framing of the problem or the proposed solution? 
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• Implementation challenges. What are the greatest obstacles to effectively implementing 
this project, and can they be overcome?  
• Potential improvements. How can the project be strengthened and its chances of success 
increased?  
• Likely impact. If successful, what magnitude of impact will the project likely have on 
cybersecurity?  Is the project scalable?  
• Role of the university. Is research and scholarship important to the success of the 
project? 
 
Participants were encouraged to think about how the projects they were considering could 
address issues being taken up by other groups beyond their own. For example, participants 
discussing a proposal intended to improve the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure were also 
asked to consider what implications it might have for privacy.  
 
Before reconvening with the other Forum participants, the working groups were asked to 
prioritize the projects they reviewed, from the perspective of which projects CWP should 
pursue, and summarize the main points and any recommendations they wished to make 
regarding each project. 
 
1. Critical Infrastructure 
 
Critical infrastructure, the physical and virtual infrastructure that underpins essential services 
in our society, has become increasingly reliant on connectivity and digital technology, and 
consequently is increasingly vulnerable to malicious cyber activities. Over the last several 
years, we have seen evidence of this in the form of reported cyber attacks on and intrusions into 
infrastructure that continue to increase in number and scope. Among the most prominent have 
been the 2015 attack on Ukraine’s power grid, which left 230,000 people in the West of the 
country without power for hours; the 2015 and 2016 thefts from the SWIFT global messaging 
system, a network employed by financial institutions to move money around the world; and the 
so-called 2017 WannaCry attack that temporarily paralyzed the British health system, among 
other affected entities – to cite just a few activities conducted by state and non-state actors. 
Perhaps the most powerful examples of recent intrusions into critical infrastructure can be 
found in the context of Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which 
was in part focused on undermining the credibility of the U.S. election process; a June 2017 
cyberattack delivered through Ukrainian accounting software, which wiped out data from the 
country’s hospitals, airports, energy companies, banks, and federal agencies, as well as data 
critical to the operations of a Danish shipping conglomerate, an American pharmaceutical 
giant, and French manufacturing company; and the March 2018 report from the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security indicating that Russian hackers had accessed machines 
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related to critical control systems at power plants in the United States.9 The U.S. Department 
of Defense’s (DoD) most recent Cyber Strategy, in fact, assumes that “a potential adversary will 
seek to target U.S. or allied critical infrastructure and military networks to gain a strategic 
advantage” during a conflict.10 Nevertheless, in 2017, DoD’s Task Force on Cyber Deterrence 
concluded that, “the unfortunate reality is that, for at least the next decade, the offensive cyber 
capabilities of our most capable adversaries are likely to far exceed the United States’ ability to 
defend key critical infrastructures.”11 In other words, not only is our critical infrastructure 
becoming more vulnerable, and are intrusions increasing in scope and effect, but the 
sophistication of the malicious actors in this space is increasing as well. As a result, improving 
the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure is an urgent priority.   
 
In the critical infrastructure working group, four projects were discussed. The first was focused 
on election infrastructure; the second on reducing the vulnerability of digital microelectronics 
to supply chain tampering; the third on information sharing among key critical infrastructure 
partners across the private and public sector; and the fourth on reducing the vulnerability to 
cyber attacks of computers that interact with the physical world, such as utility infrastructure, 
modes of transportation, and medical devices. Each project is summarized below, along with a 
few of the issues raised during the course of the discussion in the working group.   
 
A Robust Election Auditing System: This project idea is aimed at improving the security of 
elections while also improving public confidence in the broader integrity of those elections. The 
proposal is to pilot a new auditing approach in one or more jurisdictions in the United States 
that would assist in identifying vulnerabilities in any election process, increase voters’ 
confidence in the election results, and drive the development of an election process that cannot 
be subverted without detection.   
 
The auditing approach would combine two methodologies of auditing. The first would be an 
administrative “risk-limiting audit” (RLA) that typically involves election workers randomly 
sampling physical ballots and manually confirming that their contents are consistent with 
expectations given the results of the election. The second, called “end-to-end verifiability” (E2E 
verifiability), would allow voters to verify after an election that their votes had been counted 
and recorded properly, without disclosing to anyone how they voted. The pilot would be 
monitored, and an assessment done as to the effectiveness of the audit, its use, and the impact 
the process has on voters and election administrators. If successful, this two-pronged approach 
to auditing elections might be replicated in other jurisdictions.   
                                                        
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other 
Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” March 16, 2018, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A.  
10 U.S. Department of Defense, The DOD Cyber Strategy, April 2015, 
http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_cyber-
strategy/final_2015_dod_cyber_strategy_for_web.pdf. 
11 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Task Force on Cyber Deterrence, February 2017, 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/DSB-cyberDeterrenceReport_02-28-17_Final.pdf. 
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Key questions and concerns raised by participants included: (1) the cost of establishing the 
proposed auditing system, and whether most jurisdictions would be able to afford it; (2) 
whether the technical understanding of how to employ E2E-verifiable methodology is 
sufficiently advanced so as to allow for it to be deployed within a three to five-year timeframe, 
which is a requirement for CWP; and (3) whether election administrators would be open to 
trying this approach, which, in addition to being complex, would expose their systems to 
outside review in a way that could expose other problems (including ones not caused by 
attempted election meddling). On the issue of cost, participants discussed whether a prior 
attempt to implement a multi-pronged auditing approach in Travis County, Texas, might offer 
important lessons learned, and furthermore, whether a pilot might be scaled in such a way as to 
reduce the costs of this approach when adopted by multiple jurisdictions and vendors.  
 
Reducing Vulnerabilities in the Supply Chain: This project would attempt to address a key 
vulnerability for critical infrastructure, which is heavily dependent on digital microelectronics 
that often have a complex supply chain involving multiple industries, manufacturers, and 
distributors in a wide range of countries. Adding to the vulnerability, the nature of hardware 
design encourages the reuse of microelectronics, which means tampering with one design could 
provide a foothold for attacking millions of devices. This project seeks to mitigate some of the 
risks inherent in a supply chain that is built on untrustworthy parts and untrustworthy 
personnel by applying new techniques that make digital microelectronics more resistant to 
tampering and that test their trustworthiness. The techniques developed by a Columbia 
University professor and his students include algorithms that can help detect vulnerabilities in 
the supply chain and crafting designs that make it more challenging to tamper with the 
hardware. Participants agreed that this is a significant vulnerability that needs to be addressed 
and that it would be ideal if these techniques could be piloted with both a public and a private 
sector partner.     
 
Real-Time Information Sharing on Critical Infrastructure Threats: In an increasingly complex 
and dynamic cyber threat landscape, one of the most important capabilities for protecting our 
critical infrastructure is the ability to share information among critical infrastructure partners 
in the private sector and relevant government entities. The third project proposal involves 
piloting a system that would facilitate real-time, automated sharing of relevant, timely, and 
actionable threat information across the financial sector on cyber fraud – not only to enable 
proactive responses to attacks when they occur, but also to provide predictive analysis that may 
help prevent such attacks. In particular, the project would initially seek to enable information 
sharing across financial institutions about low or no-volume accounts that are opened and kept 
dormant, which are often used to commit fraud. The project would do this using a technology 
developed by a professor at Columbia University that would employ Bloom filters to facilitate 
the sharing of account information among participating financial institutions without revealing 
the identity of institutions’ clients, which is a concern for banks. The project would also look to 
companies to help identify additional corroborating indicators that are effective in spotting and 
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predicting fraud, and find ways to share information about these indicators by integrating with, 
and building on, existing fraud detection systems. If effectively piloted, this approach could be 
scaled across other financial cyber threat scenarios, as well as to information sharing in other 
critical infrastructure areas. Ideally, the project would engage both industry and government 
partners, including the Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience Center (FSARC), which 
could help provide avenues of secure, automated communication. Participants agreed that the 
current level of sharing of information on cyber threats is inadequate, and one participant noted 
that automatic sharing of a discrete and previously agreed to set of information could help to 
compensate for institutions’ general inclination not to share.  
 
Securing Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs): The fourth and final project seeks to address a 
vulnerability of legacy CPSs, or computers that interact with the physical world, which may be 
exploited to inflict significant harm. The proposed project would involve deploying in various 
scenarios a technology developed by a professor at Columbia University to reboot CPSs 
approximately once every few seconds (or even every few microseconds), to clear tainted state 
or bad inputs provided by a cyber attacker, and to thereby limit the windows within which an 
attack may be carried out. While new CPSs could be designed to be entirely stateless, some 
existing stateful systems can be better secured by repeatedly rebooting to clear state. The 
reboots are so swift – taking just one quarter of a millisecond to complete in the case of a drone, 
for example – that the systems can continue to function during that time on the basis of inertia. 
And the period between reboots – occurring approximately once every few seconds – is short 
enough to make it much more difficult for attackers to gain a foothold in the system’s memory. 
Also critical is the fact that each reboot creates a fresh copy of the software to start again. The 
replica function means that the operating program is always changing, consistently forcing the 
attacker to start from scratch and find new vulnerabilities. Participants explored possible use 
cases for this project and asked why this was preferred to other options, such as using other 




As more of our daily lives are connected to the digital world, protecting our personal 
information online has become increasingly challenging. Recent high-profile data breaches 
conducted by state and non-state actors demonstrate how vulnerable many entities are that 
hold sensitive personal data,12 though such breaches are only part of the problem. A significant 
amount of personal information about individuals can be obtained through open sources, or 
                                                        
12 Obvious examples include the U.S. Office of Personnel Management data breach in 2014, in which the private 
information of more than 22 million current and former U.S. federal government employees, contractors, and their 
friends and families was compromised, as well as the 2015 breach associated with a series of Canadian government 
websites, an attack claimed by hackers associated with Anonymous. “Government of Canada websites under 
attack, hacker group Anonymous claims responsibility,” National Post, June 17, 2015, 
https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/government-of-canada-websites-under-attack-environment-canada-
foreign-affairs-down.   
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with the willful participation of firms and platforms that gather such information. Particularly 
when such data is aggregated, significant privacy issues arise that are unique to the digital 
age.13 In addition to the legal, values-based, and ethical reasons to want to better protect the 
privacy of individuals, there are also economic and social incentives: if people lose trust in the 
capacity and will of public and private entities to protect their information and use it for 
legitimate purposes, an increasing number of people may choose to reduce their use of the 
Internet, posing a serious threat to economic growth and other avenues of empowerment it 
enables.14 Of course, the two projects considered by this working group – as well as the 
information-sharing project presented in the critical infrastructure working group – 
demonstrate how new and evolving technologies can also promote privacy. Yet, as one 
participant observed, the development of such affirmative applications has up to this point been 
relatively limited and merits greater investment. 
 
Before reviewing the two projects assigned to this group, participants discussed several 
conceptual and definitional issues around online privacy, beginning by distinguishing between 
personally identifiable information, which is information that could potentially identify a 
specific individual, and the information individuals generate – knowingly and unknowingly – 
through online behavior. Participants discussed what people’s expectations are with respect to 
these different categories of information and the extent to which governments, companies, and 
individuals should be responsible for protecting such information. Then, the group turned to 
the two projects under consideration. 
   
Giving Online Users Greater Control Over Their Data: The first project was designed to assist 
in shifting control over the data that users generate on the Internet through online browsing, 
for example, back into the hands of individuals, using a technology called MixIt. Developed by 
                                                        
13 Several academics have noted that due to technological developments over the last several decades, entities have 
become much more skilled in recording data that is produced through our daily interactions with various 
institutions, such as toll booths, grocery stores, and drugstore chains. Although such information may have been 
collected to provide individual users with better service, much of the time those users are not provided with access 
to the information collected about them, a phenomenon academics have termed “inverse privacy.” See, e.g., Yuri 
Gurevich, Efim Hudis, and Jeannette Wing, “Inverse Privacy,” Communications of the ACM, July 2016, Vol. 59 
No. 7, https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2016/7/204020-inverse-privacy/abstract. This practice raises at least 
two major concerns: (i) third parties are increasingly collecting and retaining information regarding our daily lives 
that, in aggregate, could raise significant privacy concerns; and (ii) individuals whose data is being collected might 
be able to use that information for other purposes. The latter concern raises questions as to whether individuals 
under such circumstances should have access to the information collected about them, and should be informed 
about, and perhaps even exercise some control over, its intended use and retention.   
14 Evidence of such a decline in trust abounds. For example, a recent survey of consumer perspectives on 
cybersecurity and associated privacy risks, found that consumer trust in businesses to secure their personal 
information is fading, with only 25 percent of respondents believing that most companies handle their sensitive 
personal data responsibly, and 85 percent of consumers indicating that they will not do business with a company if 
they have concerns about its security practices. Meanwhile, government actors enjoy even less trust – as 72 
percent of individuals believe companies are better equipped than government to protect their data. See, for 
example, PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Consumer Intelligence Series: Protect.me,” September 2017, 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/advisory-services/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/protect-me/cis-
protect-me-findings.pdf. 
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a Columbia University professor and his students, MixIt operates continuously in a user’s 
browser to create “cover traffic,” making it nearly impossible for the user’s real browsing data 
to be discerned and collected without her permission. As a consequence, this software could – if 
deployed widely enough -- shift the current balance of power over a user’s browser activity on 
the Internet and allow the user to have direct control over the information they produce, as 
well as perhaps enable users to generate revenue by selling such data to companies that wish to 
use it for commercial purposes. Participants discussed how many users would be necessary to 
make MixIt technology work, and whether a revenue generating model could be established 
through which thousands of users, for example, would be capable of banding together to sell 
data regarding their activity on the Internet, while recognizing that, if effective, the model 
would pose a challenge to the dominant business model of online platforms and some other 
companies.  
 
Key issues and concerns raised by participants included: (i) the impact on the economics of the 
current Internet service providers, and whether generating the critical mass of MixIt users 
would generate an unintended cost for users and non-users (e.g., reducing speed of access); (ii) 
how an individual’s unique browsing data could be catalogued and eventually shared in a way 
that would be economically useful; (iii) how one would best develop a market for such data; (iv) 
whether Internet service providers might seek to charge individuals who use MixIt (given the 
additional bandwidth use), or if the platforms and other companies that currently offer online 
services for free – through monetizing the very data that MixIt would aim to prevent them 
from collecting – would need to pass along the cost to consumers; and (5) whether the success 
of this project would mean a loss of big data that is currently useful to the public.  
 
Building a Digital Identity System: The second project proposed bringing together an 
interdisciplinary team to design and pilot an efficient, secure, decentralized digital identity 
system in an area where a significant number of people do not have access to official 
identifications. A trusted and verifiable digital identity is essential in modern digital societies 
and economies, and can serve as an official identification, which is often fundamental to a 
government’s ability to deliver vital services to its people, and in many societies can affect an 
individual’s ability to do everything from visiting a doctor, to voting in an election, to enrolling 
in school. It is also critical to accessing the private sector – financial institutions often require 
an ID to give loans and credit, and to allow people to open a bank account. Yet more than a 
billion people worldwide do not have access to an official identification, which in many cases 
results in their not having access to resources to which they are entitled. The project envisions 
working with a range of partners – including national government, industry, citizen groups, 
and experts on the local culture and the different aspects of technology (particularly smart 
phones, cyber security, and cryptography) – to build and pilot a system that would meet the 
following criteria:  
 
• universal (available to all without undue hardship involved in acquiring the capability 
and usable among all participating entities without additional identity verification); 
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• useful (fill a critical void, provide a significant enhancement to existing capabilities, or 
create opportunities for new irresistible applications to justify the cost); 
• usable (easy to use, maintain, and guide users through a transparent process in which 
she decides how much or how little information to reveal for a particular transaction); 
• secure (from fraud and abuse by criminals, corporations, or the national government; in 
addition, a lost device must be unusable by anyone other than the original owner, and 
must be straightforward to replace); 
• privacy-enhancing (should not require a centralized database that could be used to track 
user activity or commit fraud; should not force consumers to surrender anonymity 
where that would be inappropriate; and should give users the right not to use the 
system and to access an alternative ID system); and 
• affordable (should leverage existing technology platforms, networks, physical facilities, 
and institutions to help reduce costs).  
 
Any identity system would have to overcome well-justified societal concerns about individuals 
providing governments or corporations with too much visibility into their private lives. Other 
concerns include the fear of vulnerabilities that could result in the irretrievable loss of control 
over one’s identity, and significant implementation costs and technical challenges, particularly 
for any national-scale deployment and management of public key infrastructure. 
 
In discussing the proposal, participants noted that it would be important to learn from and 
build upon the systems of digital identity have been deployed in other countries, and in 
particular, from the problems that have surfaced in their implementation (the challenges with 
India’s biometric system being one example). Another participant noted that the system could 
provide a useful way to cut down on the inconvenience of managing multiple forms of 
identification and verification, and render existing indices that contain personally identifiable 
information less vulnerable to misuse. Several participants said one of the proposal’s chief 
strengths was developing the capacity for different kinds of transactions to be carried out with 
different tiers of personal information, so that the only disclosure made in the context of every 
transaction is what is absolutely necessary and no more. Participants noted that while we have 
much of the technology we need to build a secure, decentralized virtual ID, a major challenge 
would be scaling the public key infrastructures needed to apply such technology, and building 
sufficient public trust in such a system. Another participant made the case that it would be 
important not to consolidate virtual ID information in a single place, such as with a company or 
a database, so as to reduce the risk of it being compromised. Lastly, a participant recommended 
that, in addition to developing the technology for a virtual ID and conducting the behavioral, 
cultural, and public policy research to improve the likelihood of its uptake, it would also be 
important for such a project to develop a set of norms and principles, which could inform 
regulatory frameworks regarding the use of personal data and identity systems. Without such 
an effort, the participant said, public or private actors could develop systems (independent of 
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the proposed digital ID system) that could identify and even track individuals without their 
knowledge or consent, among other forms of misuse. 
 
3. Information Challenges in Social Media 
 
As is often true in the realm of the Internet, one of its greatest assets – the ability to provide 
almost immediate access to immense troves of information – has also become one of its greatest 
liabilities. Efforts to manipulate or fabricate information, of course, long predate the advent of 
the Internet. But the way information is shared and consumed on the Internet, together with 
rapid advances in technology, has made the medium particularly ripe for efforts to undermine 
the integrity of content, as well as to track, and abuse, information regarding the behavior of 
individuals. This in turn has the capacity to undermine not only the utility of the Internet, but 
also to exacerbate divisions in our societies and to weaken liberal democracies by degrading, 
among other things, our capacity for having a productive, fact-based public dialogue regarding 
issues of consequence.  
 
This is especially true in light of the growing proportion of people around the world who use 
social media platforms to get their news and other information about the issues that matter 
most to them15 and the fact that the spread of misinformation and disinformation on social 
media is increasing, at least in part because technology has made it easier to create and rapidly 
disseminate misinformation and disinformation, and harder for users – and in some instances 
even experts – to identify such false content. Indeed, the reach and penetration of these social 
media platforms (the largest, Facebook, has 2.23 billion users),16 the frequency with which 
users visit them (approximately three-quarters of Americans visit Facebook every day),17 and 
the amount of time users spend on them (the average U.S. user spends more than 50 minutes on 
Facebook every day),18 has made such platforms one of the most important – if not the 
predominant – virtual public square, and one whose reach extends across national borders. 
Consequently, how these platforms address emerging dilemmas around information integrity 
has a profound impact on everything from public discourse and user knowledge, to the way we 
understand fundamental issues like free speech.  
                                                        
15 According to a Pew Research Center Survey, approximately two-thirds of Americans adults say they at least 
occasionally get their news on social media. Elisa Shearer and Katerina Eva Matsa, “News Use Across Social 
Media Platforms 2018,” Pew Research Center, September 10, 2018, 
http://www.journalism.org/2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018/. Approximately three-
quarters of Americans visit Facebook every day. Pew Research Center, Social Media Use in 2018, March 1, 2018, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/. 
16 “Company Info,” Facebook, accessed September 18, 2018, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/.   
17 Pew Research Center, Social Media Use in 2018, March 1, 2018, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/. 
18 James B. Stewart, “Facebook Has 50 Minutes of Your Time Each Day. It Wants More.” The New York Times, 
May 5, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/facebook-bends-the-rules-of-audience-
engagement-to-its-advantage.html.   
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The concerns associated with misinformation and disinformation are exacerbated by other 
issues that arise in social media environments, which cannot easily be disaggregated if we are to 
identify sustainable and effective responses. For example, as online social networks play a 
growing role in shaping not only users’ views but also their relationships and communities, 
there are growing concerns that the way social media platforms present content to users, and 
the algorithms they often use to order such content, are further aggravating existing cleavages 
in society – presenting users with filtered content that affirms their own views, and even 
perhaps driving users towards more extreme views and content. This in turn may undermine 
some of the critical elements of liberal democracies, such as the ability to agree on shared 
arbiters of basic facts, and the exposure to ideas that are different from one’s own. Another 
central element to understanding content accurately comes from relevant context that is 
frequently not explicit in an online environment – such as, who is paying for a message to be 
disseminated to a given user, and why has that individual been targeted as a recipient? Such 
context can help the user judge, among other things, the credibility of a message, particularly 
when it appears in the context of political campaigns.   
 
Furthermore, while social media platforms in many ways function as a virtual public square, the 
human and algorithmic decisions that are made regarding their operation are not fully 
transparent – information that may well be critical to understanding, and potentially improving 
upon, the way they function. Of course, sharing such information would need to take into 
account the privacy of users, but greater transparency regarding how these platforms work is 
essential to understanding how they are shaping our societies and individual behavior. The 
working group on information challenges considered two project proposals intended to assist 
in addressing the foregoing problems.  
 
Social Media Solutions Lab: This project proposal envisioned two methods for developing and 
testing potential solutions to specific information challenges in social media identified above: (i) 
working inside existing social media platforms; and (ii) working outside of existing social media 
platforms. For the inside approach, the concept would be to work with one or several of the big 
platforms to develop and test solutions for key information challenges, such as ways to mitigate 
the spread of misinformation and disinformation; to increase the credibility of accurate 
information; or to enable users to select different ways of ordering, labeling, or filtering the 
content that appears in their feeds – distinct from the order prescribed by the platform’s 
algorithm. The feedback from users testing out such options, or “filters,” could then be 
compared to those not using such options or the filters, in an effort to gauge whether any 
particular tool is effective. For the outside approach, a partner platform serving a bounded 
community would offer an “open protocol” system, whereby users and third parties would be 
able to design different filters that would give individuals the power to curate their own feeds, 
or prioritize the way content is ordered according to different metrics (such as giving 
preference to accuracy or a diversity of views). This approach would effectively push control 
and power out to the ends of the network, rather than monopolizing such decisions in the 
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center, as is the default with the big platforms. In addition, the lab would allow third parties to 
compete to provide better overall interfaces for viewing the content and incentivize the 
continual improvement of such solutions, in order to try to attract more users.  
 
Key issues raised by participants included: (i) whether, given the choice, users would want to 
see a broad spectrum of viewpoints, or would prefer to see information and views that support 
their own; (ii) similarly, whether users would prioritize accuracy when they consume content 
on social media; (iii) whether the “inside” approach was viable, given that it would likely cut 
against the existing platforms’ business models (even though a decentralized model might be 
advantageous to platforms, given that handing over more decision-making power to individual 
users would allow platforms to be perceived as less of an arbiter); (iv) what other solutions for 
information challenges might be tested in such a lab scenario; and (v) for the “outside” 
approach, whether the ideas discussed, including new methods of filtering information, could be 
adequately tested without the collaboration of the big platforms (in part because researching 
these ideas at scale is critical to both understanding the problem and testing solutions, given 
that some information challenges only emerge among a user base that is larger than the one 
likely to be attracted to a test bed).  
 
A Platform for Addressing Information Challenges: The second project would aim to help 
individual users process, filter, and understand information they consume online, by giving 
social media users the ability to share – in a secure, anonymous way – information that they 
generate through their use of Internet. The information shared by individuals would be 
aggregated on a platform in a way that is accessible, user-friendly, and transparent, where it 
could then be used by researchers and developers to build tools aimed at addressing the most 
common challenges revealed in the shared data, much of which is currently only in the hands of 
social media companies. Tools developed on the platform would, in turn, be offered to the full 
spectrum of social media users, to layer atop their platforms in a way that would improve their 
information consumption. Issues and concerns raised by participants included: (i) whether it 
would be possible to convince existing social media platforms to share the necessary data 
regarding users’ behavior (with users’ permission, of course), develop a rigorous methodology 
to “read” an individual’s information consumption within existing data structures for these 
purposes, and then make the information accessible to those wishing to develop tools for users; 
(ii) whether it would be possible to build exemplar tools to tackle known issues (such as 
revealing deep fakes and flagging content generated by foreign influence campaigns); and (iii) 
the importance of agreeing on a framework for measuring whether the tools are working. 
 
Ultimately, the group settled on a hybrid of the proposals, which had two parts. First, creating 
a solutions laboratory that would bring together an interdisciplinary mix of software engineers, 
policy experts, social and behavioral scientists, journalists, and others to develop a set of 
applications aimed at giving users ways to improve their consumption of information and 
remedy crucial challenges such as disinformation campaigns; piloting these applications, and 
conducting research on their efficacy; and providing a forum for reaching out to the social 
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media companies to press for the adoption of tools proven to be effective. And second, working 
with one of the major platforms to develop a set of filters, which would be tested with a subset 
of willing users, in order to measure the impact of giving individuals greater power in shaping 
their social media feeds. Ideally, those filters that proved useful could then be offered to the 
platform’s full network of users. Among the platforms that might be approached, there was a 
strong view that Twitter should be considered in light of its previous efforts to tackle some of 
these problems; previous applications that have been created to filter content on Twitter; and 
the openness the company has demonstrated its approach and work with others on the 
presentation of information. Academics also noted that regardless of the partner, it would be 
important to negotiate up front the extent to which data received from a platform can be shared 
publicly, so that researchers are able to publish findings. 
 
4. Standards, Benchmarks, and Best Practices 
 
As was discussed in the initial plenary by participants, one of the most significant steps that 
could be taken to improve cybersecurity across the board would be for organizations and 
individuals to prioritize basic cybersecurity practices. The current failure to do so is 
widespread, well documented, and generally decried, yet no clear path to solving the problem 
has been identified. As such, one of the main questions raised was whether an appropriate set of 
incentives could be established to promote the adoption of standards, benchmarks, and best 
practices when it comes to cybersecurity. 19    
 
The working group discussed three projects aimed at motivating private and public sector 
actors and individuals to prioritize good cybersecurity practices and better manage the 
associated risks. At the outset, the working group identified several major barriers to the 
development, adoption, and application of effective cybersecurity standards, including: (i) the 
monetary and human resource costs associated with compliance; (ii) the fact that individual 
users – who have a critical role to play in prevention, detection, and resilience – often lack the 
                                                        
19 The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) – a nongovernmental organization that develops 
voluntary, consensus-based, and market relevant international standards – defines a standard as “a document, 
established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines, or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of 
order in a given context.” Although further work on standards that meet this definition would be useful, numerous 
standards have already been developed for cybersecurity to help organizations better manage security risk and 
implement security controls. The cybersecurity framework created by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) is one example of a framework that sets out a core set of activities that organizations of all 
kinds and sizes can take to assess their cyber risks and take action to reduce them, focusing on five key functions: 
identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. Private sector actors have also formed their own structures and 
mechanisms to share information in order to reduce risk and increase resilience – and to coordinate cooperation 
with the government – such as the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, or ISACs, which are organized by 
sector (e.g. financial services and water). See “Standards in Our World,” International Organization for 
Standardization, accessed September 18, 2018, 
https://www.iso.org/sites/ConsumersStandards/1_standards.html; National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, “Cybersecurity Framework,” U.S. Department of Commerce, accessed September 18, 2018, 
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework. 
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tools, knowledge, and incentives to play that role; (iii) a crowded market, with various 
frameworks for incentivizing cybersecurity practices, but no one-size-fits-all solution; 20 (iv) the 
difficulty of effectively implementing better cybersecurity practices, whether because of the 
continuing reliance on legacy systems,21 longstanding business practices that inhibit adoption, 
or other reasons; and (v) the difficulty of measuring the efficacy of, and compliance with, such 
frameworks. The working group additionally discussed the particular need to focus further 
work on establishing cybersecurity standards and practices for the development of devices that 
are part of the Internet of Things, which are becoming more ubiquitous by the day. Experts 
predict more than half of all new businesses will make use of the Internet of Things by 2020,22 
at which time it is estimated some 20 billion such devices could be deployed worldwide.23 Yet 
the lack of adequate measures to secure the Internet of Things is making it easier for hackers to 
compromise the growing number of connected devices through the weakest link. Established 
best practices for the Internet of Things might be tied to a similar incentive structure as the 
one applied to organizations and individual users, or it could be different (for example, relying 
on a labelling or rating system managed by a third-party assessor that consumers would find 
trustworthy).      
 
A Cybersecurity Bond Rating: The first project proposal focused on incentivizing the private 
and public sectors to improve their cybersecurity practices by promoting the further 
development of quantifiable Benchmarks, Standards, Guidelines, and Best Practices (BSGBs), 
including for the Internet of Things. The project would then pilot the promotion of these 
BSGBs through a rating system that would evaluate entities’ adoption of such standards by 
virtue of an auditing process. Measurable indicators would be developed to assist in the 
auditing process, and the BSGBs would be published to ensure consistency and signal to the 
market what was being considered. Rating agencies would evaluate the “cyber-worthiness” of a 
product or entity based on their assessed adoption of BSGBs, either in the context of an overall 
rating or in a separate bond product, as has been done in the context of “green bonds,” which 
                                                        
20 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework being a key exception, as a widely used 
framework that sets out a core set of activities that organizations of all kinds and sizes can take to assess their 
cyber risks and act to reduce them.  
21 As one expert noted, even if an entity chooses to implement controls based on a framework like NIST, 
implementing those controls across all of the technology upon which that entity relies is often complicated by the 
use of outdated “legacy systems.” This technology tends to be less secure because it is no longer subject to regular 
vulnerability patching and can be incompatible with controls needed to defend against evolving threats. (Entities 
tend to keep such systems because they are viewed as too critical to take down for even a short period of time, or 
because upkeep is seen as less costly than investing in new systems.) As a result, entities may implement controls 
on some but not all of their systems, potentially undermining the efficacy of adopting and implementing a 
framework like NIST.  
22 Gartner, “Gartner Says By 2020, More Than Half of Major New Business Processes and Systems Will 
Incorporate Some Element of the Internet of Things,” January 14, 2016, 
https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3185623.   
23 Liam Tung, “IoT Devices Will Outnumber the World's Population This Year for the First Time,” ZDNet.com, 
February 7, 2017, https://www.zdnet.com/article/iot-devices-will-outnumber-the-worlds-population-this-year-
for-the-first-time/. 
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attempt to evaluate the environmental impact of certain bond-issuers. In theory, companies 
desirous of a good cyber-worthiness rating would adopt the relevant BSGBs, thereby 
improving their, and their customers, cybersecurity.  
 
Key issues and concerns raised by participants included: (i) whether this structure would 
effectively incentivize entities to fully implement BSGBs; (ii) whether a financial services 
framework would be capable of collecting and integrating relevant data into a pricing model 
within the project’s desired time horizon of three to five years; (iii) whether it would be possible 
to establish a sufficiently flexible set of BSGBs to reflect the range of actors subject to such 
criteria; (iv) whether the BSGBs could be both effective and sufficiently affordable for smaller 
public and private entities to adopt; (v) what entity should bear primary responsibility for 
managing the rating system; and (vi) whether it would be possible to induce private companies 
to disclose sufficient information regarding cyber incidents and practices to conduct a credible 
audit. Overall, participants indicated that flexible criteria capable of taking into account various 
entities’ different vulnerabilities, resources, and risk tolerances would be important; that the use 
of relative metrics that would allow entities to measure themselves against similarly situated 
organizations would be useful; that the auditing process should be automated to the greatest 
extent possible, in order to reduce the cost for participating entities; and that a collaboration 
between an academic institution, such as Columbia University, and a traditional rating agency 
could be beneficial.  
 
Cybersecurity Insurance: The second project was complementary to, but distinct from, the first 
in that it proposed developing uniform metrics and an auditing process for measuring 
adherence to defined BSGBs, in order to provide the foundation for a cybersecurity insurance 
market. The institution responsible for the audit would verify an entity’s relative compliance 
with the BSGBs and certify the entity before an insurance underwriter. Insurance agencies 
would then be able to offer cybersecurity insurance at a premium rate for approved entities. 
With Allianz, a leading integrated financial services provider, predicting that the global 
premiums for cybersecurity insurance are expected to exceed $20 billion by 2025,24 the ability 
to reduce premiums would provide an incentive for companies that wish to purchase 
cybersecurity insurance to improve their cybersecurity performance, while additionally 
lowering the risk and vetting costs for insurance providers. That said, participants questioned 
what prior evidence of risk reduction would be required for the insurance market to lower costs 
for entities that implement certain cybersecurity measures. 
 
Cybersecurity Education for Children: The third project would seek to work with an 
educational partner to design and pilot a comprehensive cybersecurity curriculum aimed at 
enhancing the digital literacy of middle school students, with the goal of eventually rolling out 
the curriculum across a range of ages in public schools across a U.S. state. Children have unique 
                                                        
24 Allianz SE, “Businesses must prepare for new generation of cyber risks,” September 9, 2015, 
https://www.allianz.com/en_GB/press/news/studies/150909-businesses-must-prepare-for-cyber-risks.html.  
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vulnerabilities in cyberspace, which are only increasing as they use the Internet at younger 
ages, with greater frequency, and with less supervision. While repeated calls have been made 
for educating children (and their parents and teachers) about how to make better choices 
regarding their security, privacy, and health online, efforts to achieve this have so far been 
scattershot and ineffective – lacking rigor and breadth, and leaving schools with strained 
budgets and limited expertise to develop their own responses. The overarching goal of the 
proposed curriculum would be to give youth the knowledge and tools to use the Internet and 
technology safely – taking advantage of the opportunities, while also being aware of the risks; 
and to inculcate a culture of cybersecurity that promotes a more secure Internet. A potential 
partner would be Theorem Studios, which is developing a multi-platform storytelling 
experience focused on cybersecurity, including a series of 20 short films, Virtual Reality 
content, podcasting, and social media, which could be incorporated into the curriculum.  
 
Participants queried how the impact of the curriculum could be tracked and measured on a scale 
that would be useful for research, so as to learn whether what was being taught translated into 
changes in behavior, and said more research was needed on whether such an effort is already 
being worked on by other institutions. Participants also highlighted several potential obstacles 
to – or complexities involved in – implementing this project, including: (i) the lack of 
instructors in middle and high schools qualified to teach such a curriculum; (ii) the 
decentralized nature of the U.S. educational system, which would preclude systematic 
dissemination of a curriculum; and (iii) the lack of consensus among policymakers, 
administrators, teachers, and even parents of the need for cybersecurity education. There was a 
consensus among the working group participants that the curriculum should not simply be 
online and that communicating the importance of a cybersecurity education to the full range of 
education and policy leaders would be vital. Independent of a CWP project, multiple 
participants suggested that Columbia could provide expertise for the Theorem Studios project 
aimed at improving public understanding of cybersecurity.   
 
5. Norms and Deterrence  
 
The norms and deterrence working group considered how the development of international 
norms and a strategy to promote deterrence could help promote security and stability in 
cyberspace. Although most countries have indicated that international law applies in this realm, 
considerable work remains to explain and to agree on how existing law and norms apply in the 
cyber sphere, both in peacetime and in the context of an armed conflict. Participants agreed 
that the development of additional cyber norms and activities designed to support such norms 
could help to reduce the risks of misperception, miscalculations, and escalation; deter 
aggressive action; and ultimately foster collaboration among cyber actors to reduce our 
collective vulnerability in a way that promotes predictability and enhances stability. The 
working group considered two projects in this area, with the first focused on building norms 
and the second on building a deterrence strategy. 
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Tech Accord Partnership: The first project would bring private companies together with 
academics to develop industry norms aimed at enhancing cybersecurity and ultimately 
promoting the development of norms for state actors. The proposed project would involve 
expanding and strengthening the Cybersecurity Tech Accord,25 a public commitment by more 
than 60 global companies to protect users everywhere, oppose cyber attacks on innocent 
citizens and enterprises, and empower people to strengthen cybersecurity protection. The 
project would aim to improve and build upon of the norms promoted by the Tech Accord in 
two ways. First, by strengthening the existing norms – through analyzing ambiguities, 
exploring possibilities for refinement or elaboration, considering metrics for analyzing 
compliance, identifying and facilitating partnerships to promote industry norms currently 
endorsed by the Tech Accord, as well as identifying and sharing best practices associated with 
such norms. And second, by identifying areas for the development of additional norms, such as 
norms for the Internet of Things or for the operators of critical Internet infrastructure.  
 
Participants underscored that – given the importance of the private sector to cybersecurity 
from a practical perspective in the digital realm, the power wielded by a handful of global 
companies that manage significant aspects of cyberspace, and the time required on average to 
create binding, global treaties – a private-sector-led initiative on cyber norms presents an 
appealing way to promote the development of effective norms for state-actors. Nevertheless, 
participants raised some questions regarding the nature of the proposed relationship between 
the academic group and the companies participating in the Tech Accord, and queried whether 
the power wielded collectively by the private sector could ever come close to that of 
government (and thus the degree to which any industry norms could have a significant impact 
on cybersecurity). These concerns notwithstanding, participants suggested several areas – 
beyond providing expert analysis on the technical and policy aspects of existing and new norms 
– where academic research and scholarship could be useful to the Tech Accord, including: (i) 
offering insights regarding effective industry self-regulatory efforts, drawing on prior historical 
examples; (ii) helping to develop some kind of independent oversight body, which would help to 
evaluate the success of the Tech Accord in affecting the behavior of industry entities and the 
promotion of broader norms; and (iii) creating some sort of accountability mechanism, perhaps 
simply through naming and shaming activity that is inconsistent with the Tech Accord.  
 
Promoting a Strategy for Deterrence: The second project would bring together university 
researchers with partners such as the Cyber Threat Alliance, the National Intelligence Council, 
and the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center to develop a standard and transparent 
methodology to help assess whether (and under what conditions) U.S. government deterrent 
                                                        
25 The Cybersecurity Tech Accord, “About the Cybersecurity Tech Accord,” https://cybertechaccord.org/about/. 
(Accessed November 27, 2018.) The four key principles adopted by signatories of the Tech Accord are: 1. We will 
protect all of our users and customers everywhere. 2. We will oppose cyberattacks on innocent citizens and 
enterprises from anywhere. 3. We will help empower users, customers and developers to strengthen cybersecurity 
protection. 4. We will partner with each other and with likeminded groups to enhance cybersecurity.    
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actions suppress future cyber attacks. This project would assist in evaluating the policy 
promoted in the new U.S. National Cyber Strategy26 of imposing “swift, costly, and transparent 
consequences” when malicious actors harm the United States or its partners, which, it is 
presumed, will deter malicious actors from attacking U.S. assets. Participants pointed out that 
there is currently no methodology to measure whether such a policy will deter or provoke 
additional attacks, and thus a rigorous review of its impact will be critical to evaluating its 
success. This project would aim to develop and test such a methodology, updating it as the 
cyber landscape evolves, with the primary aim of facilitating unclassified assessments by the 
commercial cyber threat intelligence community, and the secondary aim of serving the U.S. 
Intelligence Community.  
 
Working group members recognized the utility of formulating an objective standard of 
measurement to determine the effectiveness of different cyber deterrence strategies, as well as 
the value associated with collecting and analyzing data of this sort and making it accessible to 
other researchers. Nevertheless, participants raised concerns regarding the degree to which it 
would be possible to measure causality with respect to the impact of deterrence measures, given 
the multitude of variables that could lead to an acceleration or deceleration of cyber attacks by 
malicious actors, and given that the United States does not typically acknowledge offensive 
cyber activities intended to impose consequences on those who have attacked the United States. 
In response, one participant suggested that the methodology would most likely calculate 
ranges that, taken together, could at least suggest causal effects, which was a technique used by 
the Correlates of War project at the University of Michigan. Of course, that would not address 
the concern regarding whether any actions taken by the United States to impose consequences 
on malicious actors are likely to be disclosed by the United States or other governments in the 
context of a deterrence strategy – a vital data point for such an analysis. Another concern 
raised was whether this project would meet the criteria for CWP projects, as it would not 
clearly result in measurable impact unless the government decided to pursue a strategy or 
decision based on the research carried out (nor, for that matter, is it likely that a government 
would acknowledge using such research, even if it were to do so).  
III. Conclusions and Project Selection  
 
When participants reconvened in a plenary session, the five moderators reported out on the 
project ideas discussed in their respective working groups, describing the cybersecurity 
challenge each project would seek to address and the working group’s assessment of its main 
strengths and weaknesses. Participants were then given a chance to ask follow-up questions 
about projects that had been discussed in other working groups.  
 
                                                        
26 The President of the United States, National Cyber Strategy of the United States of America, September 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf.  
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Next, each participant was asked to identify the two or three projects that she or he thought 
were most promising out of all of those described, and to provide recommendations regarding 
which projects should be further developed by CWP for possible funding and implementation. 
In weighing the projects that most merited pursuing, participants were reminded of CWP’s key 
criteria: namely, that projects should bring multidisciplinary academic research and scholarship 
to bear on the challenge of cybersecurity, in partnership with a non-academic entity, in an effort 
to produce measurable impact within roughly three to five years – while simultaneously 
enriching research and scholarship. 
 
It was notable that virtually every project received support from one or more participants, 
which speaks to the quality of ideas proposed and the breadth of cybersecurity challenges 
worthy of attention. Nevertheless, three projects proposals received the greatest support for 
further development by CWP: (i) a digital identity system, (ii) a robust election auditing 
system, and (iii) an online laboratory for testing solutions to the information and privacy 
challenges in social media and other online activity. In addition, several other project ideas 
were identified as having significant potential, whose further development CWP might 
encourage other parts of Columbia University and outside partners to carry forward.   
 
The first project would bring together an interdisciplinary team to design and pilot an efficient, 
secure, decentralized digital identity system that could be deployed in a country where a 
significant number of people do not have access to official identification, and as a consequence 
are unable to access resources to which they are entitled. (For more detail on the project, see 
pages 17-18.) The project envisions working with a government partner, as well as with the 
Omidyar Network (which is promoting essential work in this area), industry, citizen groups, 
behavioral and political scientists, and others to build and pilot a system that is universal, 
decentralized, useful, usable, secure, privacy-enhancing, and affordable.  
 
Participants were drawn to the transformative impact that such a project could have – not only 
in developing countries, but also in developed countries – as well as its ability to reduce our 
reliance on personally identifiable information, which is extremely vulnerable to hacks and 
other misuse. Among the key questions and concerns raised in the plenary discussion were 
whether it would be too ambitious to tackle both technological and implementation challenges 
(cultural, political, behavioral, etc.) inherent in a digital ID system; whether the technology 
required for a digital ID, such as a device capable of using biometric authentication, would be 
affordable at scale; how to integrate the digital ID with existing systems that are used to carry 
out transactions; and how to attain the buy-in of critical industries such as banking and finance. 
Participants noted that it would be important to understand how this project would 
complement, rather than replicate, efforts already underway in this field, such as those being 
led by the World Bank. 
 
The second project would combine two forms of auditing to detect efforts to tamper with 
election tallies: a risk-limiting audit and a public audit using a technique known as end-to-end 
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verifiability. The former typically allows election workers to sample physical ballots and 
manually confirm that their contents are consistent with expectations, given the result of an 
election; while the latter would allow any voters, after the election, to check whether their votes 
were properly recorded. (For more detail on the project, see pages 13-14.) The project 
envisions partnering with one or more electoral jurisdictions in the United States to build and 
pilot a system that would apply this two-pronged auditing approach, and measure 
its effectiveness and impact on elections, such as voter turnout and trust. The project is rooted 
in the fact that no matter how hard governments and election administrators work to secure 
elections, they will not be impervious to tampering. And it recognizes that any attack on voting 
infrastructure has the potential not only to alter the results of a particular election, but also to 
undermine citizens’ trust in the integrity of the entire electoral system, which is critical to their 
participation in a democracy.  
 
Many participants highlighted the timeliness of this idea, given the increasing number of 
sophisticated attacks on voting systems and the declining trust of citizens in the integrity of the 
electoral process. It was the view of participants that, if successfully piloted, this approach 
would have relevance beyond the United States, as liberal democracies around the world are 
facing similar threats and deficits in public confidence. Among the questions raised in the 
plenary discussion were whether election authorities would be able to bear the costs of 
developing and implementing such an effort, and whether the design and testing of end-to-end 
verifiability technology could be achieved in the three-to-five-year window prescribed by CWP.   
 
The third project would bring together a pair of proposals that were discussed in different 
working groups: information challenges in social media and privacy. (For more detail on the 
respective projects, see pages 20-22 and 16-17.) One proposal was to create a social media 
solutions laboratory, which would marshal an interdisciplinary team of software engineers, 
policy experts, social and behavioral scientists, journalists, and others to develop a set of online 
applications for social media, which would give users ways to curate and interpret the 
information they consume on the Internet, and mitigate challenges such as disinformation and 
the echo chamber effect. An application that might be among those tested in this lab could be 
the project proposed in the privacy working group, which operates continuously in a user’s 
browser to create “cover traffic,” making it nearly impossible for the user’s real browsing data 
to be discerned and collected without her permission. The lab would pilot these applications 
with a test group of users, conducting research on their efficacy. At the same time, the lab 
would explore the possibility of working with one or more of the big social media platforms to 
develop a set of filters, which would give users greater agency in shaping their information diet.  
 
While a few participants continued to question whether content integrity on social media 
should indeed be considered a cybersecurity issue (a point raised in the opening plenary 
session), multiple participants underscored that the challenge was central for a range of 
cybersecurity issues such as privacy, which will only get worse if left unaddressed. And given 
the current public backlash against leading social media companies due to their past failures to 
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address these issues, participants were of the view that they might be more willing than before 
to work with an outside entity on testing solutions to some of these chronic problems. That 
said, participants felt more work was required to articulate how the lab would actually work, 
including how it would be different from similar efforts to address these problems.  
 
Finally, there were four additional proposals that – while not seen as being the right fit for full 
CWP projects – were, in the view of participants, areas where Columbia University and an 
outside partner could make a significant contribution to addressing fundamental cybersecurity 
challenges. It was the view of participants that these ideas, which were conceived of and 
developed in the context of the CWP Forum, merited further development. The first of these 
focused on reducing the risks associated with the supply chain for digital microelectronics (for 
more detail on the project, see page 14). Multiple participants pointed out that supply chain 
security represents a major blind spot in cybersecurity efforts, and that both government and 
private sector partners would benefit from applying the technology being developed at 
Columbia. The second project in this category proposed developing a system to facilitate real-
time, automated sharing of relevant, timely, and actionable threat information to critical 
infrastructure, using the financial industry to develop a proof of concept (for more detail on the 
project, see pages 14-15). The idea was not only to enable swift and collective responses to 
attacks when they occur, but also to provide predictive analysis that may help prevent such 
attacks from taking place. Here too, the synergies developed between Columbia experts and 
financial industry leaders in the run up to the Forum was viewed as worth developing further. 
The third and fourth projects in this category were discussed in the norms and deterrence 
working group. One proposed bringing academic knowledge to bear on improving a set of 
cybersecurity norms for the tech industry, with an eye towards informing the eventual 
development of such norms for state actors; while the other proposed designing and testing a 
standard methodology to assess the effectiveness of cyber deterrence strategies pursued by the 
U.S. government (for more detail on these projects, see pages 26-27). Given the potential 
impact of these proposals and the positive feedback they received from Forum participants, 
CWP staff will try to facilitate the further development of these project proposals.  
IV. Next Steps: Project Development, Assessment, and 
Implementation  
 
For each of the three projects identified above, CWP will work with the project leads to 
develop a formal project proposal, which will include a description of the project, its objectives, 
the individuals and institutions that would be involved, a general sense of how long it would 
take to implement, and a rough estimate of the amount of the money it would cost. The 
proposals should also address outstanding questions, recommendations, and critical feedback 
on each project that were surfaced during the Forum. In December 2018, these three project 
proposals will be presented to the CWP Advisory Committee, which will advise on whether 
they merit further development as potential CWP projects.  
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Projects that are determined to merit further development will receive an initial tranche of 
funding to undergo a rigorous project design phase of approximately three months, during 
which the project leads will work with CWP staff to define the major deliverables, a precise 
timeline for implementation, a funding plan, a set of performance indicators for monitoring and 
evaluation, and the principal implementing partners. All of this information will be synthesized 
in a project design plan. CWP staff will then prepare an evaluation of this report, which 
identifies potential impact and strengths and weaknesses, and recommends whether the project 
should be funded. This evaluation, the project design plan, and earlier feedback from the 




A number of people helped to organize and shape the CWP Forum on Cybersecurity, to whom 
we are profoundly grateful.  
 
First, we thank the many individuals who gave generously of their time in advance of the 
Forum, informing our understanding of the challenge, developing ideas for specific projects, 
and suggesting potential partners for implementation. They include (unless otherwise noted, 
the academic institution with which individuals are affiliated is Columbia University): 
Alexander Abdo, Senior Staff Attorney, Knight First Amendment Institute; Jonathan Albright, 
Director, Digital Forensics Initiative, Tow Center for Digital Journalism; Steven M. Bellovin, 
Professor, Computer Science Department; Sarah Cleveland, Louis Henkin Professor of Human 
and Constitutional Rights and Faculty Director of the Human Rights Institute at Columbia 
Law School; Jared Cohen, CEO, Jigsaw; Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Clerk (Texas); 
Antonio DeSimone, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab; Doug Dicconson, 
Managing Partner, Theorem Studios; Renée DiResta, Data for Democracy; Jen Easterly, 
Managing Director of Morgan Stanley and Global Head of the Cybersecurity Fusion Center; 
Katy Glen Bass, Research Director, Knight First Amendment Institute; Orin Herskowitz, 
Executive Director, Columbia Tech Ventures; Suman Jana, Assistant Professor in Computer 
Science Department; Sam Jones, Palantir; Justin Kossylin, Jigsaw; Neal Kelley, Registrar of 
Voters for Orange County, California; C.V. Madhukar, Omidyar Network; Katherine Maher, 
Wikimedia Foundation; Susan McGregor, Tow Center for Digital Journalism; Ellen Meier, 
Director of Center for Technology & School Change and Professor of Practice, Teachers 
College; Fran Moore, Financial Systemic Analysis and Resilience Center; Shailagh Murray, 
Executive Vice President for Public Affairs; Kenneth Prewitt, Carnegie Professor of Public 
Affairs; Satish Rao, Associate Director of Physical Sciences Licensing, Columbia Tech 
Ventures; Anya Schiffrin, Lecturer in Discipline of International and Public Affairs; Bruce 
Schneier, Chief Technology Officer at IBM Resilient and Lecturer in Public Policy at the 
Harvard Kennedy School; Anthony E. Shorris, Weinberg Visiting Professor, Princeton 
University; Jake Sullivan, Yale Law School; Michael Ting, Professor of Political Science and 
International and Public Affairs; Chris Wiggins, Associate Professor in the Department of 
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Applied Physics and Applied Mathematics and Chief Data Scientist at the New York Times; 
Jeannette Wing, Avanessians Director of the Data Science Institute and Professor of Computer 
Science; Moti Yung, Google. We would like to recognize in particular two members of the 
Columbia faculty – Professor Salvatore Stolfo and Associate Professor Simha Sethumadhaven – 
both of whom developed projects that could be implemented by using intellectual property they 
had previously developed.   
 
Second, we are deeply indebted to the moderators of the Forum’s working groups, who went 
above and beyond to facilitate discussions of proposed projects and improve our work in all 
respects: the Hon. Jeh Johnson (critical infrastructure); Dana Hyde (privacy); Jameel Jaffer 
(information challenges in social media); the Hon. Lisa Monaco (standards, benchmarks, and 
best practices); and the Hon. John Brennan (norms and deterrence).   
 
Third, we thank the experts who enriched the discussions of specific projects in the Forum’s 
working groups: Alexander Abdo, Steven M. Bellovin, Sarah Cleveland, Antonio DeSimone, 
Doug Dicconson, Jen Easterly, Malo Hutson, C.V. Madhukar, Susan McGregor, Ellen Meier, 
Shailagh Murray, Hillary Schrenell, Michael Ting, Abiah Weaver, Chris Wiggins, and Moti 
Yung. 
 
Fourth, we extend our appreciation to the Columbia graduate students who supported the 
working groups at the Forum: Veronica Nnenna Akaezuwa, Preetam Dutta, Courtney Murray, 
Michelle Ritter, Elizabeth Anne Watkins; to Flovijana Morina, Chandra Osborne, and Mariela 
Sierra from the Columbia University Programs and Events team, for their help setting up the 
event; to KatyAnna Johnson and Christina Shelby from the Office of the President, for their 
tireless assistance with invitations; and in particular to Cassie Ziegler.  
  
Finally, our greatest thanks go to the Forum participants, whose names and biographies are 
listed in the annex that follows.  
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VI. Annex: Biographies of Forum Participants  
  
Lee C. Bollinger 
President, Columbia University 
 
Lee C. Bollinger became Columbia University’s nineteenth president in 
2002. Under his leadership, Columbia stands again at the very top rank 
of great research universities, distinguished by comprehensive 
academic excellence, historic institutional development, an innovative 
and sustainable approach to global engagement, and unprecedented 
levels of alumni involvement and financial stability. Bollinger is 
Columbia’s first Seth Low Professor of the University, a member of the 
Columbia Law School faculty, and one of the country’s foremost First 
Amendment scholars. As president of the University of Michigan, 
Bollinger led the school’s historic litigation in Grutter v. Bollinger 
and Gratz v. Bollinger. These Supreme Court decisions that upheld and clarified the importance 
of diversity as a compelling justification for affirmative action in higher education were 
reaffirmed in the Court’s 2016 ruling in Fisher v. University of Texas. As Columbia’s president, 
Bollinger conceived and led the University’s most ambitious expansion in over a century with 
the creation of the Manhattanville campus in West Harlem.  An historic community benefits 
agreement emerging from the city and state review process for the new campus provides 
Columbia’s local neighborhoods with decades of investment in the community’s health, 




Investment Partner for Digital Identity, Omidyar Network 
Magdi Amin is an Investment Partner with Omidyar Network (ON) in 
Washington, DC, where he focuses on global strategy and investments 
in Digital Identity, with a particular focus on the US and Africa. ON’s 
vision is for a world in which everyone has access to “good identity” 
that empowers and protects individuals’ rights to privacy and security 
in the digital world. Before joining Omidyar, Amin served for nearly 
two decades with the World Bank Group (WBG). Most recently, he 
managed corporate strategy at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector 
arm of the WBG. Previous roles included Head of Country Engagement, Principal Economist 
for the EVP and CEO, Manager of Investment Climate Advisory in the Middle East/North 
Africa (MENA) region, and Principal Economist and Strategist for the East Asia/Pacific 
region. In a personal capacity, he writes on Nubian cultural heritage. Amin received an A.B. 
from Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and an M.A. from the Johns Hopkins School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS). 
  
  34 
Emily Bell 
Professor of Professional Practice and Director of the Tow 
Center for Digital Journalism, Columbia University 
 
Emily Bell is founding director of the Tow Center for Digital 
Journalism at Columbia's Graduate School of Journalism and a 
leading thinker, commentator, and strategist on digital journalism. 
Established in 2010, the Tow Center has rapidly built an 
international reputation for research into the intersection of 
technology and journalism. The majority of Bell’s professional 
career was spent at Guardian News and Media in London working as an award-winning writer 
and editor, both in print and online. As editor-in-chief across Guardian websites and director of 
digital content for Guardian News and Media, Bell led the web team in pioneering live 
blogging, podcasting, multimedia formats, data and social media, making The Guardian an 




Senior Cryptographer at Microsoft Research; Director of the 
International Association for Cryptologic Research 
 
Josh Benaloh is Senior Cryptographer at Microsoft Research and an 
affiliate faculty member in the School of Computer Science and 
Engineering at the University of Washington. He earned his S.B. in 
mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his 
M.S., M.Phil., and Ph.D. degrees from Yale University, where his 1987 
dissertation Verifiable Secret-Ballot Elections introduced the use of 
homomorphic encryption as a paradigm to enable election tallies to be 
verified by individual voters and observers without having to trust election equipment, 
vendors, or personnel. Benaloh serves on the Coordinating Committee of the Election 
Verification Network, spent 17 years on the Board of Directors of the International Association 
for Cryptologic Research, and is an author of the September 2018 report, Securing the Vote: 
Protecting American Democracy, by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and 
Medicine. 
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Hon. John O. Brennan 
Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
 
John O. Brennan served as Director of CIA (2013-2017) and 
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (2009-2013). During his first stint at CIA (1980-
2005), he was the daily intelligence briefer to President Clinton, 
Chief of Station in the Middle East, Chief of Staff to D/CIA 
George Tenet, Deputy Executive Director, and the first Director 
of the National Counterterrorism Center. Brennan has a B.A. from 
Fordham University and an M.A. from the University of Texas at 
Austin. He also studied at the American University in Cairo (1975-





Lead Analytical Manager, U.S. Public Finance Infrastructure 
Group at S&P Global Ratings 
 
Geoffrey Buswick is a Managing Director and Sector Leader in the 
U.S. Public Finance - Governments team at S&P Global Ratings in 
Boston. Buswick focuses on developing research and educating the 
market about S&P Global’s approach to rating municipal entities 
and its views on emerging risks in the public finance sector. He 
speaks regularly on the topics of cybersecurity, sustainability, direct 
purchase bank loans, distressed credits, and specific aspects of the 
local government and school district criteria. Buswick also serves as 
a committee chair for local government and water & wastewater ratings. Much of his work 
aims at improving transparency and external understanding of S&P Global’s public finance 
rating process. Prior to joining S&P Global, Buswick served as the Chief Financial Officer, 
Treasurer & Collector for the City of Gloucester, Massachussetts. In addition, he spent three 
years as the Administrative Officer for the City of North Adams, Massachussetts. Buswick 
served on the board of governors of the National Federation of Municipal Analysts (NFMA) 
from 2010-2013, and was the co-chair for the 2012 and 2013 NFMA Annual Conferences. In 
2017, he received the “Award for Excellence” from the NFMA. Buswick also served on his 
town’s Finance Committee from 2008-2015. Buswick holds both a B.A. in Political Science and 
a Masters of Public Administration from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
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Thomas Donahue 
Former Senior Director for Cyber Operations at the National Security Council 
 
Thomas Donahue – who currently works at the environmental and energy consulting firm 
SC&A, Inc. and serves as a cyber advisor to The Cipher Brief – retired from CIA after 32 years 
of service. He served as the Chief Editor of the President’s Daily Brief and other CIA daily 
production during the second term of the Clinton administration, and he spent the last 18 years 
of his career focused on cyber threats as a manager and senior analyst in what is now known as 
the Center for Cyber Intelligence. He served four years at the White House during the Bush 
and Obama administrations, most recently as the senior director for cyber operations for the 
National Security Council staff. During his last two years, he was the research director at the 
DNI’s Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. He has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
 
 
Hon. Thomas E. Donilon 
Former National Security Adviser to the President; Chair of the 
Presidential Commission to Enhance National Cybersecurity; 
Chairman of the BlackRock Investment Institute 
 
Thomas E. Donilon is Chairman of the BlackRock Investment 
Institute and Senior of Counsel at the international law firm of 
O’Melveny & Myers. He served as National Security Advisor to 
President Barack Obama. In that capacity, Donilon oversaw the U.S. 
National Security Council staff, chaired the cabinet level National 
Security Principals Committee, provided the President’s daily national security briefing, and 
was responsible for the coordination and integration of the administration’s foreign policy, 
intelligence, and military efforts. Donilon also oversaw the White House’s international 
economics, cybersecurity, and international energy efforts. Donilon served as the President’s 
personal emissary to a number of world leaders.   
 
 
Scott Flom  
IT Director, Travis County Clerk’s Office, Texas 
 
Scott Flom has spent over 20 years in Executive Management, 
including Operations, Product Management, and Information 
Technology. This includes work in the Elections Systems, Equipment 
Manufacturing, and IT industries. As the VP of Operations for an 
Elections Systems company, he had overall responsibility for the 
implementation of Electronic Voting Systems in two of the ten most 
populous counties in the United States. After work in other industries, 
Flom has returned to his first love, IT team management.  
 
  37 
Ben Fried  
Chief Information Officer, Google 
 
Ben Fried is Google’s Chief Information Officer, overseeing the 
technologies that make Googlers go. He’s the New York office Tech 
Site Lead, responsible for 3,000 Googlers in the company’s East Coast 
headquarters. Fried has a diverse background in systems engineering 
and software development. He led development of mission scheduling 
software for NASA at a Bay Area startup, and spent over a decade at 
Morgan Stanley, where he rose to the level of Managing Director, and 
led teams responsible for software development, internet infrastructure, and business 
intelligence. Fried is a graduate of Columbia University. 
 
Nathaniel Gleicher  
Head of Cybersecurity Policy at Facebook 
Nathaniel Gleicher is a computer scientist and a lawyer, and 
works at the intersection of technology, policy, and law. He has 
taught computer programming, built and secured computer 
networks, prosecuted cybercrime at the U.S. Department of 
Justice, and served as Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the 
National Security Council (NSC) in the White House. At the 
NSC, he developed U.S. government policy on key technology 
and cybersecurity challenges, including encryption, cyber 
deterrence, internet governance, and network security. Since leaving government, Gleicher 
served as head of cybersecurity strategy at Illumio, and is currently the Head of Cybersecurity 
Policy at Facebook. 
 
Donna Gregg  
Head of Asymmetric Operations at the Johns Hopkins 
University Applied Physics Laboratory 
 
Donna Gregg is the Sector Head for the Asymmetric Operations 
Sector at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 
(APL), where she is responsible for more than 1,300 staff supporting 
efforts to combat the asymmetric threats of terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction, and offensive cyber. She began her career at APL 
in 1984 and has served in numerous leadership roles including Mission Area Executive for 
Cyber Operations, Managing Executive of the Applied Information Sciences Department, and 
Strategic Focus Area Lead for Information Assurance in the Info Centric Operations Business 
Area, as well as in several branch and group supervisor-level positions within the laboratory. 
She currently serves on the Board of Advisors for the National Institute for Hometown 
Security and on the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee sponsored by the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics. She has an M.S. in mathematics from 
Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. in mathematics from the University of Maryland.   
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Avril Haines 
Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University; Deputy 
Director, Columbia World Projects 
 
Avril D. Haines is currently a Senior Research Scholar at Columbia 
University and a Lecturer in Law at Columbia Law School. She 
served as Deputy National Security Advisor to President Obama, 
was the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
served as the Legal Adviser to the National Security Council. Before 
joining the NSC, she led the Treaty Office at the Department of 
State, was the Deputy Chief Counsel for the United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, worked for The Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, and served as a law clerk 
for Judge Danny Boggs on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. Haines received a bachelor’s degree in Physics from the 
University of Chicago, a law degree from Georgetown University Law Center, and founded and 
ran a bookstore café for five years while engaged in community service in Baltimore. 
 
 
Jason Healey  
Senior Research Scholar in the School of International and Public 
Affairs, Columbia University 
 
Jason Healey is Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s 
School for International and Public Affairs, specializing in cyber 
conflict and risk. He started his career as a US Air Force intelligence 
officer, before moving to cyber response and policy jobs at the White 
House and Goldman Sachs. He was founding director for cyber issues 
at the Atlantic Council where he remains a Senior Fellow and is the 
editor of the first history of conflict in cyberspace, A Fierce Domain: 
Cyber Conflict, 1986 to 2012. He is on the DEF CON review board and served on the Defense 
Science Board task force on cyber deterrence.   
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Dana J. Hyde 
Venture Partner, JVP; Former CEO of the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation 
 
Dana Hyde is a senior executive with over 25 years of experience in 
law, public policy, and international development. She served eight 
years in the Obama Administration, as Chief Executive Officer of 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Associate Director 
at the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and Senior Advisor to the 
Deputy Secretary of State. Hyde also served as Counsel to the 9/11 Commission and as Special 
Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration. Earlier in her career 
Hyde practiced law at WilmerHale in London and in Washington, DC at Zuckerman Spaeder. 
She is currently a Partner at the venture capital firm JVP.  
 
 
Jameel Jaffer  
Executive Director of the Knight First Amendment Institute at 
Columbia University 
 
Jameel Jaffer is inaugural director of the Knight First Amendment 
Institute at Columbia University. Previously, he was deputy legal 
director of the American Civil Liberties Union, where he oversaw 
that organization's work relating to free speech, privacy, national security, and international 
human rights. He has argued cases at all levels of the federal court system, including in the 
Supreme Court, and has testified many times before Congress and administrative agencies. His 
most recent book, The Drone Memos, was published by the New Press in the fall of 2016. 
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Merit Janow  
Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia 
University 
 
Merit E. Janow is an internationally recognized expert in international 
trade and investment, with extensive experience in academia, 
government, international organizations, and business. She is Dean of 
the Faculty and a Professor of Practice in International Economic Law 
& International Affairs at Columbia University’s School of 
International and Public Affairs (SIPA) and affiliated faculty at 
Columbia Law School. As Dean, she has launched a major initiative 
around technology and policy, and initiated new research and programs around the digital 
economy, cyber security, and internet governance. Janow has had three periods in government 
service: in December 2003, Janow was elected for a four-year term as one of the seven Members 
of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body – the first female to serve as a judge 
on the Geneva based appellate body, which hears government to government disputes on 
economic issues. From 1997 to 2000, she served as the Executive Director of the first 
international antitrust advisory committee of the U.S. Department of Justice. Prior to joining 
Columbia’s faculty, she was Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and China 
(1989-93), responsible for all bilateral trade negotiations between the United States and both 
Japan and China. She negotiated more than a dozen trade agreements. She has written two 
books and numerous articles. Janow is on the Board of Directors of several companies in 
financial services and technology and several not-for-profit organizations such as MasterCard, 
the American Funds, and the National Committee on United States-China Relations. She was 
raised in Tokyo, Japan and speaks Japanese.  
 
 
Sam Jeffers  
Co-founder of Who Targets Me 
 
Jeffers is the co-founder of Who Targets Me (https://whotargets.me), 
software to help voters understand how political campaigns are chasing 
their vote using social media advertising. To date, over 10,000 people 
have installed Who Targets Me in more than 50 countries. The project 
has tracked political advertising in 10 election campaigns in the last 18 
months and is currently monitoring its use in the Brazilian and US 
midterm election campaigns. 
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Eric Johnson 
Professor of Business at Columbia Business School and Director of 
the Center for the Decision Sciences 
 
Eric Johnson is the Norman Eig Chair of Business and Director of the 
Center for Decision Sciences at Columbia Business School. His research 
examines the interface between behavioral decision research, economics 
and the decisions made by consumers, managers, and their implications 
for public policy, markets, and marketing. He was awarded the 
Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award from the Society for 
Consumer Psychology, and named a Fellow by the Association for 
Consumer Research, was awarded an honorary doctorate in Economics from the University of 
St. Gallen, and is a Fellow of the Association for Psychological Science. According to the 
Institute for Scientific Information, he is one of the most highly cited scholars in Business and 




Hon. Jeh Johnson 
Former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
Jeh Johnson is a partner with the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton 
& Garrison LLP and the former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security 
(2013-2017). Prior to that, Johnson was General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense (2009-2012), General Counsel of the Department 
of the Air Force (1998-2001), and an Assistant United States Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York (1989-1991). Johnson is a Fellow 
in the American College of Trial Lawyers and a member of the Council 
on Foreign Relations. He is a graduate of Morehouse College (1979) and Columbia Law School 
(1982), and the recipient of nine honorary degrees. Johnson frequently lectures at Harvard, 





Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History  
 
Ira Katznelson is Ruggles Professor of Political Science and 
History at Columbia University. His 2013 book Fear Itself: The 
New Deal and the Origins of Our Time has been awarded the 
Bancroft Prize in History and the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation Award in Political Science. Other books include 
the just-published Southern Nation: Congress and White Supremacy After Reconstruction (co-
authored with David Bateman and John Lapinski).  Katznelson is a former president both of the 
American Political Science Association and the Social Science Research Council. He earned his 
B.A. at Columbia College and his Ph.D. in History at the University of Cambridge, where he 
served in 2017-18 as Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions. 
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Nicholas Lemann 
Director, Columbia World Projects; Director, Columbia 
Global Reports; Joseph Pulitzer II and Edith Pulitzer Moore 
Professor of Journalism; Dean Emeritus of the Faculty of 
Journalism 
 
Nicholas Lemann directs Columbia World Projects, a new 
initiative to connect academic work with entities beyond the 
academy that possess the power and influence to transform 
research into concrete consequences benefiting humanity. He also 
directs Columbia Global Reports, a book publishing venture that 
presents reporting around the globe on a wide range of political, 
financial, scientific, and cultural topics. Lemann is Dean Emeritus 
and Pulitzer Moore Professor of Journalism at Columbia. During his deanship, the Journalism 
School completed its first capital fundraising campaign, started its first new professional degree 
program since the 1930s, and launched significant initiatives in investigative reporting, digital 
journalism, and executive leadership for news organizations. Board memberships include 
Columbia’s Knight First Amendment Institute and the Russell Sage Foundation. Lemann is a 
member of the New York Institute for the Humanities and the American Academy of Arts and 




Policy and Standards Lead, Bridgewater Associates 
 
Charles Luftig is the Head of Security Policy for Bridgewater 
Associates. Prior to working at Bridgewater, he served as the 
Deputy General Counsel at the Office of Management and 
Budget at the White House. He also held several legal and policy 
roles at the National Security Council as Senior Adviser to the 
Deputy National Security Adviser (2015-2016), Deputy Legal 
Adviser to the National Security Council (2014-2015), and 
Director for Counterterrorism (2012-2013). Luftig also worked 
in the National Security Division at the Department of Justice from 2010-2012, where he 
received the 2013 Attorney General Award for Excellence (the highest honor awarded by the 
Department) and the 2012 Assistant Attorney General Award for Excellence (the highest 
honor awarded by the Division). Earlier in his career, he worked as a litigator in private 
practice and clerked for the Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia. Luftig is a graduate of the University of Michigan and the 
University of Virginia School of Law.  
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Michael Lynton 
Chairman of Snap, Inc. 
 
Michael Lynton served as the CEO of Sony Entertainment from April 
2012 until February 2017, overseeing Sony’s global entertainment 
businesses, including Sony Music Entertainment, Sony/ATV Music 
Publishing and Sony Pictures Entertainment. Beginning in January 2004, 
Lynton also served as Chairman and CEO of Sony Pictures 
Entertainment. Prior to joining Sony Pictures, Lynton worked for Time 
Warner and served as CEO of AOL Europe, President of AOL 
International, and President of Time Warner International. He earlier 
served as Chairman and CEO of Pearson PLC's Penguin Group where he oversaw the 
acquisition of Putnam, Inc. and extended the Penguin brand to music and the Internet. 
  
Lynton currently serves on the Board of Snap, Inc., Pearson, PLC, Schrodinger, LLC, IEX, and 
Ares Management, L.P. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the 
Harvard Board of Overseers, and serves on the boards of the Los Angeles County Museum of 
Art, the Tate, and the Rand Corporation. Michael holds a B.A. in History and Literature from 
Harvard College, where he also received his M.B.A. 
 
 
John J. MacWilliams 
Fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia 
University; Former Associate Deputy Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Energy 
John J. MacWilliams is a Fellow at the Center on Global Energy 
Policy at Columbia University. Prior to joining CGEP, 
MacWilliams served as Associate Deputy Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Energy after being appointed in August 2015. He 
also served as DOE's Chief Risk Officer and, before that, as a 
Senior Advisor to the Secretary. Prior to DOE, MacWilliams 
was a partner of Tremont Energy Partners, LLC, a private investment firm based in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Prior to Tremont, he was Vice Chairman, Investment Banking, at 
JP Morgan Chase, a Partner of JP Morgan Partners, and a founding partner of The Beacon 
Group, LLC, a private investment firm located in New York and acquired by JPMorgan Chase 
in 2000. He was also Partner and Co-Head of the Beacon Group Energy Investment Funds. 
Prior to the formation of The Beacon Group, MacWilliams was with Goldman Sachs & Co. and 
an attorney at Davis Polk & Wardwell. MacWilliams holds a BA from Stanford, an MS from 
MIT, and a JD from Harvard Law School.  
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Erel Margalit 
Founder and Chairman of JVP 
 
Erel N. Margalit, Ph.D., founded JVP over 24 years ago, and is one of the 
chief architects of the startup nation, bringing innovation and 
entrepreneurial leadership to the country’s most pressing political, 
economic, and social challenges. Chosen for the Forbes Midas List as the 
first venture capitalist with the golden touch, Margalit has led numerous 
global exits as managing partner of JVP, including implementing the 
first state sponsored incubator into the famed JVP family of funds, 
creating the Media Quarter in Jerusalem, and leading the Cyber Security 
effort in Beer Sheva. In addition to helping orchestrate the $4.8 billion sale of Chromatis to 
Lucent Technologies in 2000, Margalit successfully led investments in companies such as 
QlikTech (NASDAQ:QLIK), Cogent Communications (NASDAQ: CCOI), Netro (initial public 
offering; JVP subsequently sold its shares at a $5.5 billion company valuation), Cyoptics 
(acquired by Avago for $434 million), Precise (initial public offering and subsequently acquired 
by Veritas), Scorpio (acquired by US Robotics), Fundtech, ViryaNet, Jacada, and Allot, among 
others, in addition to leading the investment and serving as the Chairman of CyberArk 
Software (NASDAQ: CYBR) for numerous years. During his tenure as Member of the Israeli 
Knesset from 2013-2017, Margalit served as a Member of the Security and Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Finance Committee. Margalit led the Knesset’s Cybersecurity Taskforce and 
the Taskforce developing the North and South of Israel, implementing various economic 
development initiatives around the country. Margalit also spearheads the Innovation Initiative 
for the Mediterranean Basin countries, engaging 14 Arab countries on projects around 




Founder and CEO of Floor64; Editor of the Techdirt Blog 
 
Mike Masnick is the founder & editor of the popular Techdirt blog as 
well as the founder of the Silicon Valley think tank, the Copia Institute. 
In both roles, he explores the intersection of technology, innovation, 
policy, law, civil liberties, and economics. His writings have been cited 
by Congress and the EU Parliament.  According to a Harvard Berkman 
Center study, his coverage of the SOPA copyright bill made Techdirt 
the most linked-to media source throughout the course of that debate. 
Masnick and Techdirt have also been key players in the ongoing battles over net neutrality and 
encryption. Masnick is also known for coining the term "The Streisand Effect," to describe how 
attempting to stifle speech online can serve to draw even more attention. 
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Hon. Denis McDonough 
Visiting Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s Technology and 
International Affairs Program; Former Chief of Staff to the 
President of the United States 
 
Denis McDonough served as White House Chief of Staff to 
President Barack Obama from February 1, 2013 to January 20, 
2017. In this role, he managed a four-thousand-member White 
House staff, as well as Cabinet Secretaries and agency leaders. 
He provided strategic advice to the President on the most 
significant domestic policy, national security, and management 
issues facing the federal government; enforced plans and 
accountability for performance goals; and planned and 
coordinated efforts to recruit and retain key talent in the federal government. Prior to the 
White House, McDonough served in senior leadership and policy-making positions in the U.S. 
House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. McDonough is currently a Senior Principal at the 
Markle Foundation and chairs its Rework America Task Force, a national initiative to 
transform the labor market so that all Americans can thrive in the digital economy. He also 
serves as an executive fellow at the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global 
Affairs. McDonough is a graduate of St. John’s University (MN) and Georgetown University 
School of Foreign Service. 
 
 
James Miller  
President and CEO of Adaptive Strategies LLC; Former Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy 
 
Dr. James N. Miller is President and CEO of Adaptive Strategies LLC, 
which advises clients on technology issues and building organizational 
capacity. He is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University’s Applied 
Physics Lab and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science & 
International Affairs. Miller serves on the Board of Advisors for Endgame, Inc. and for the 
Center for a New American Security. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Defense Science Board, where he co-
chaired a study on cyber deterrence. He served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the 











  46 
Hon. Lisa Monaco 
Former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism; Co-Chair of the Aspen Institute 
Cyber Group  
 
Lisa Monaco has spent more than two decades in public service 
and in senior management and advisory positions in law 
enforcement and national security. As the President’s Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism Advisor from 2013-2017, she coordinated the federal government’s crisis 
management and response to a wide array of risks and challenges, from cyberattacks and 
pandemics to terrorist threats. Monaco also spent 15 years at the Department of Justice, 
serving as a career federal prosecutor, as well as in senior management positions in the Justice 
Department and the FBI, where she served as Chief of Staff to then-FBI Director Robert S. 
Mueller, III and helped him lead the FBI’s post-9/11 transformation. In 2011, she was 
nominated and confirmed to serve as Assistant Attorney General for National Security, the first 
woman to serve in that position. In this role, she oversaw all federal terrorism and national 
security prosecutions. She made investigating and prosecuting national security cyber threats a 
top priority and created a nationwide network of national security cyber prosecutors. Monaco 




General Manager, Microsoft 
 
Kate O’Sullivan is the general manager of Digital Diplomacy within 
Microsoft’s Corporate, External and Legal Affairs Department. In this 
role, O’Sullivan leads Microsoft’s global cyber security strategy and 
related public policy campaigns such as its Defending Democracy and 
Digital Peace initiatives. Prior to working at Microsoft, O’Sullivan was 
managing director at the global communications and public affairs 
consultancy, Burson-Marsteller, heading up their Corporate Practice in 
San Francisco. Earlier in her career, she was on the co-founding team and 
was vice president of marketing and communications at SEVEN Networks. Before SEVEN, 
O’Sullivan was vice president and managing director at Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide, 
and managed Ogilvy’s Silicon Valley technology practice. O’Sullivan currently serves on the 
board of 826 National, IESE Business School, Bay Area Council and sf.citi. She graduated from 
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Sean Roche 
Associate Deputy Director of CIA for Digital Innovation 
 
Sean P. Roche is a senior government executive with more than 37 years 
of federal service. In March 2015, he was named Associate Deputy 
Director of CIA for Digital Innovation, serving as the second-in-
command of CIA’s first new directorate in more than 50 years. The 
Directorate of Digital Innovation (DDI) is responsible for cyber 
intelligence, open source collection, secure global communications, 
worldwide mission information systems, data curation, and data science. 
The DDI also accelerates the integration of advanced digital capability across all of CIA’s 
mission areas. Additionally, the CIA’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Data Officer 
(CDO) serve within the DDI.  Immediately prior to this position, Roche served as the Associate 
Deputy Director of CIA for Science and Technology. Over the course of his career, Roche has 
held various senior leadership positions across a wide range of missions, disciplines, and 
tradecraft, ranging from research and development to clandestine operations. Within the 
Directorate of Science and Technology, he served in senior leadership roles in the Offices of 
Development and Engineering, Technical Collections, Global Access, Integrated Missions, and 
Mission Resources. He led teams that developed, delivered, and deployed satellite and airborne 
reconnaissance systems, next generation collection platforms, clandestine technical operations, 
and advanced targeting tradecraft. In addition to his assignments at CIA, Roche has also served 
in positions across the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. He is a 
recipient of the Distinguished and Meritorious Presidential Rank Awards, the CIA Director’s 
Award, the Directorate of Operations Donovan Award, and other Intelligence Community and 





Professor in the Computer Science Department, Columbia 
University; Former Chief Technology Officer for the United States 
Federal Communications Commission 
 
Prof. Henning Schulzrinne, Levi Professor of Computer Science at 
Columbia University, received his Ph.D. from the University of 
Massachusetts in Amherst, Massachusetts. He was a member of technical 
staff at AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill and an associate 
department head at GMD-Fokus (Berlin), before joining the Computer 
Science and Electrical Engineering departments at Columbia University. He served as chair of 
Computer Science Department from 2004 to 2009, and as Engineering Fellow, Technical 
Advisor, and Chief Technology Officer of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
from 2010 until 2017. Protocol standards co-developed by Schulzrinne, including RTP, RTSP 
and SIP, are now used by almost all Internet telephony and multimedia applications. He is a 
fellow of the ACM and IEEE. 
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Simha Sethumadhaven 
Associate Professor of Computer Science, Columbia University 
 
Simha Sethumadhavan is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at 
Columbia University. Sethumadhavan’s research at Columbia is focused on 
finding practical solutions to problems in the areas of cybersecurity and 
computer architecture. He is a recipient of an Alfred P. Sloan Research 
Fellowship, the NSF CAREER award and an IBM co-operative research 
award. His work has received nine best paper awards for his work on 
computer security and computer architecture, and his team has successfully 
taped out three novel computing chips (e.g., an analog-digital computing chip) on shoestring 
budgets. His team’s work on identifying security vulnerabilities resulted in fixes to major 
products such as mobile phone processors and web browsers used by millions of users, and his 
work on hardware security is actively considered by standards organizations. He has served on 
the Federal Communications Commission Downloadable Security Technical Advisory 
Committee. He is the Founder & CEO of Chip Scan Inc., a hardware security company focused 
on finding and mitigating hardware backdoors. Sethumadhavan obtained his Ph.D. from the 





President and Chief Legal Officer of Microsoft 
 
Brad Smith serves as the President of Microsoft Corporation. He leads a 
team of 1,500 professionals working in 56 countries, where they are 
responsible for the company’s legal work, intellectual property portfolio, 
corporate philanthropy, public policy, corporate governance, social 
responsibility issues and compliance matters. Smith plays a key role in 
representing the company externally and in leading its work on a number of 
critical issues including privacy, security, accessibility, environmental sustainability, human 
rights and digital inclusion. In 2013, he was named by the National Law Journal as one of the 
100 most influential lawyers in the United States. In 2014, the New York Times called Smith “a 
de facto ambassador for the technology industry at large.” 
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Alissa Starzak 
Director of Public Policy, Cloudflare 
 
Alissa Starzak is the Head of Policy at Cloudflare, a web security and 
optimization company. Prior to joining Cloudflare, Starzak worked for the 
U.S government in a variety of national security positions, including 
serving as General Counsel of the U.S. Army, Deputy General Counsel 
(Legislation) at the Department of Defense, counsel to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and assistant general counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency. 
She also worked in private practice in Washington, D.C., and clerked for The Honorable E. 
Grady Jolly, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. She graduated from Amherst College 
and the University of Chicago Law School, where she served as an editor of the University of 




Forum Director, Columbia World Projects 
 
Nik Steinberg is the Forum Director at Columbia World Projects. He 
previously served as the Counselor and Chief Speechwriter for Amb. 
Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Prior to that, 
Steinberg was Senior Researcher in the Americas Division of Human 
Rights Watch, where his work focused primarily on Mexico and Cuba. He 
is a graduate of Dartmouth College and the Harvard Kennedy School of 




Professor of Computer Science, Columbia University  
 
Salvatore Stolfo has been a Professor of Computer Science at 
Columbia University since 1979. He is credited as creating the area of 
machine learning applied to intrusion detection in cybersecurity and 
has created several anomaly detection algorithms and systems addressing some of the hardest 
problems in securing computer systems. He was elevated to IEEE Fellow for his contributions 
to machine learning based computer security. Stolfo has been a member of several National 
Academy committees evaluating Army and Navy cybersecurity activities. He has been granted 
over 80 patents, several of which have been engaged in major infringement litigation. Stolfo has 
published hundreds of papers, with many receiving best paper awards. He has consulted for 
major U.S. financial institutions, U.S. government agencies, defense contractors, and serves as 
an advisor to  a venture capital firm. Two cybersecurity companies, Allure Security and Red 
Balloon Security, have been spun out from his Intrusion Detection Laboratory.  Both 
companies have been actively sponsored by the Department of Defense and Department of 
Homeland Security.  
 
 





Liviu Librescu Professor of Law, Columbia Law School 
 
Matthew C. Waxman is the Liviu Librescu Professor of Law at Columbia 
Law School, where he directs the national security law program. He is also 
co-chair of the Cybersecurity Center at Columbia University’s Data Science 
Institute and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy at the 
Council on Foreign Relations.  
 
Waxman previously served at the U.S. Department of State, as Principal Deputy Director and 
Acting Director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff. His prior government 
appointments included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Director for Contingency 
Planning and International Justice at the National Security Council, and executive assistant to 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.  Waxman is a graduate of Yale College and Yale 
Law School, and he studied international relations as a Fulbright Scholar in the United 
Kingdom. After law school, he served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice David H. Souter 




Jeannette M. Wing 
Avanessians Director of the Data Science Institute and Professor of 
Computer Science, Columbia University 
 
Jeannette M. Wing is Avanessians Director of the Data Science Institute 
and Professor of Computer Science at Columbia University. From 2013 to 
2017, she was a Corporate Vice President of Microsoft Research. She is 
Consulting Professor of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon where she 
twice served as the Head of the Computer Science Department and had been 
on the faculty since 1985. From 2007-2010 she was the Assistant Director of 
the Computer and Information Science and Engineering Directorate at the National Science 
Foundation. She received her S.B., S.M., and Ph.D. degrees in Computer Science, all from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Wing's general research interests are in the areas of 
trustworthy computing, specification and verification, concurrent and distributed systems, 
programming languages, and software engineering. She received Distinguished Service Awards 
from the CRA and ACM. She is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
AAAS, ACM, and IEEE. 
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Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin 
Director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 
Tel Aviv University 
 
Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin has been the Director of Tel Aviv 
University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Israel's 
leading strategic think tank, since November 2011. Yadlin was 
designated Minister of Defense of the Zionist Union Party in the March 2015 elections. Yadlin 
served for over 40 years in the Israel Defense Forces, nine of which as a member of the IDF 
General Staff. From 2006-2010, Yadlin served as the IDF’s chief of Defense Intelligence. From 
2004-2006, he served as the IDF attaché to the United States. In February 2002, he earned the 
rank of major general and was named commander of the IDF Military Colleges and the 
National Defense College. A former deputy commander of the Israel Air Force, Yadlin has 
commanded two fighter squadrons and two airbases. He has also served as Head of IAF 
Planning Department (1990-1993). He accumulated about 5,000 flight hours and flew more 
than 250 combat missions behind enemy lines. He participated in the Yom Kippur War (1973), 
Operation Peace for Galilee (1982) and Operation Tamuz – the destruction of the Osirak 
nuclear reactor in Iraq (1981). Yadlin holds a B.A. in economics and business administration 
from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (1985). He also holds a Master's degree in Public 
Administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (1994). 
 
 
